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Is Everything Securities Fraud?
Emily Strauss*
“An odd fact of the U.S. legal system for public companies is that every
crime is also securities fraud: If a company does a bad thing, and regulators find
out about it, then the bad-thing regulators can punish it for doing the bad thing,
but the securities regulators can also punish it for not disclosing the bad thing to
shareholders. . . . It is a strange combination: Generally speaking the companies
do the bad things on behalf of shareholders—to make more money for them—but
then the securities regulators come in and fine them for defrauding shareholders.”
-Matt Levine1
Securities litigation is a virtually inevitable fact of life for any public
company. Often, investors sue because the firm’s managers engaged in fraud that
directly harmed the shareholders—say, by doctoring the firm’s financials, or lying
about known business prospects. However, shareholders also sue their companies
when those companies engage in conduct that primarily harms a different set of
constituents. When a drug on the market proves to have dangerous side effects, a
faulty car battery bursts into flames, or an oil rig explodes, it’s difficult to say
that the most direct victims are the companies’ shareholders. Yet shareholders
commonly sue under the federal securities laws based on precisely this kind of
conduct, on the basis that the managers should have better disclosed the underlying
facts, and investors were harmed by the resulting drop in stock price because they
did not. In recent years, these cases, dubbed “event-driven securities litigation,”
have become more common and have drawn increasing criticism on the grounds
that they are opportunistic and generally lack merit. However, there has so far
been no comprehensive examination of these lawsuits.
This paper seeks to fill the gap by investigating the prevalence and attributes
of these lawsuits. In a sample from 2010 to 2015, I find that roughly 16.5% of
securities class actions arise from conduct where the most direct victims are not
shareholders. However, I find that these cases have roughly a 20% lower
likelihood of being dismissed and settle for significantly higher amounts. These

* For helpful comments, I thank Jennifer Arlen, Sam Buell, Albert Choi, Jim Cox, Deborah Demott,
Ofer Eldar, Jessica Erickson, Joe Grundfest, Michael Klausner, Alex Platt, Adam Pritchard, Michael
Simkovic, Andrew Verstein, David Zaring and participants in the Duke University School of Law
workshop and the National Conference of Business Law Scholars. Errors are my own.
1. Matt Levine, Opinion, Snap Earnings and Emissions Fraud, BLOOMBERG ( May 11, 2017,
6:10 AM ), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-11/snap-earnings-and-emissions-fraud
[ https://perma.cc/VKJ5-6LB6 ].
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lawsuits are also more likely to be brought against large defendant firms, more
likely to involve an institutional investor as a lead plaintiff, and much more likely
to involve a non-SEC investigation or inquiry than cases where the primary
victims are shareholders. Many of these attributes are used in the literature as
proxies for merit. However, I argue that the merit of these cases is not clear-cut.
Further, from a policy perspective, while these cases may have deterrence
value, they may not be an optimal means to monitor corporate misconduct that
harms outsiders.
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INTRODUCTION
Securities litigation is a virtually inevitable fact of life for any public company.
Often, investors sue because the firm’s managers engaged in fraud that directly
harmed the shareholders—say, by doctoring the firm’s financials, or lying about
known business prospects. However, shareholders also sue their companies when
those companies engage in conduct that more directly harms a different set of
constituents. When a pharmaceutical company sells dangerously contaminated
drugs,2 a faulty car battery bursts into flames,3 or an oil rig explodes,4 it’s difficult
to say that the direct victims of the misconduct are the companies’ shareholders.
Yet shareholders commonly sue under the federal securities laws based on precisely
this kind of conduct, on the ground that the managers should have better disclosed
the underlying facts, and investors were harmed by the resulting drop in stock price
because they did not. This has led at least one notable commentator to argue that
“everything is securities fraud.”5 Objections from industry and academia to these

2. Monk v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 10-4841, 2011 WL 6339824 ( D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2011 ).
3. In re Tesla Motors Inc. Sec. Litig., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2014 ).
4. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712 ( S.D. Tex. 2012 ).
5. Matt Levine, Opinion, Bored Apes Go to Court, BLOOMBERG ( Feb. 22, 2022, 10:43 AM ),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-02-22/bored-apes-go-to-court [ https://perma.cc/
EMP8-R6ZP].
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lawsuits, dubbed “event-driven litigation,” are becoming increasingly vocal.6
However, although there is general documentation of the rise in event-driven
securities class actions in recent years,7 there has so far not been a comprehensive
study of their prevalence, attributes, and outcomes.
This Article seeks to address this gap in the literature by conducting a
comprehensive analysis of securities class actions. I first seek to evaluate the extent
to which securities class action lawsuits are driven by events in which the primary
victims are not shareholders. Second, I examine the outcomes of these lawsuits and
whether they are likely to be more lucrative for plaintiffs and their law firms. Third,
I examine the role of government investigations in these lawsuits, with particular
attention to inquiries by regulators other than the SEC. Fourth, I investigate who is
behind these lawsuits, specifically focusing on major institutional investors and
leading law firms. Finally, I consider whether these lawsuits are desirable,
particularly whether they are an effective device in monitoring firms’ compliance
with regulation and mitigating harm to society.
For the observational analysis, I read almost 500 securities class actions against
public firms using the data from the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse from 2010 to 2015.8 I code each case based on whether the primary
victims of the company’s conduct are its investors, or some other group. The first
novel finding of this study is that roughly 16.5% of securities class actions arise
from misconduct where the most direct victims are not shareholders. I also find
that these cases have significantly lower dismissal rates and generate higher
settlements than cases where the primary victims are shareholders. Investors have a
20% higher chance of having their lawsuit dismissed if the misconduct at issue
primarily harms them. The average shareholder settlement in cases where the
misconduct most directly harms other victims is more than double the average
settlement for those cases where the primary victims are shareholders.9 Accordingly,
6. Critics contend that these actions are problematic because plaintiffs’ lawyers can simply
capitalize on the investigative work of the government or the tort victims already suing the company
for the same event, making them “easy for plaintiffs to bring even though they are likely to have less
merit.” Michelle Reed & Matthew Lloyd, Stemming the Tide of Meritless Securities Class Actions, EXPERT
ANALYSIS ( Thomson Reuters ), Mar. 8, 2019, at 3, https://www.akingump.com/a/web/102513/
SEC-Reed-Lloyd.pdf [ https://perma.cc/M28Z-J3WC].
7. See id.; see also Michael Klausner, Sam Blake Curry & Jason Hegland, Guest Post: “Stock Drop
Lawsuits,” D&O DIARY ( June 28, 2020 ), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/06/articles/
securities-litigation/guest-post-stock-drop-lawsuits/ [ https://perma.cc/R6KE-2X5X ] ( investigating
the incidence of “stock drop” lawsuits ).
8. See Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A Collaboration with Cornerstone Research,
STAN. L. SCH., http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html [ https://perma.cc/HU4P-C2R3 ] ( last
visited Aug. 25, 2022 ).
9. The correlations between dismissal and settlement rates and whether the conduct alleged
directly harms shareholders or other victims persist even when controlling for firm size, class
period duration, court expertise, and indicia of merits of the lawsuit, such as institutional investors
as lead plaintiffs, earnings restatements within the class period, and whether the complaint cited an
SEC investigation.
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the empirical analysis supports the notion that event-driven securities class actions
are big-ticket cases; substantial money and resources are tied up in securities lawsuits
where the primary victim is not a shareholder. This success is likely due in large part
to my second finding, which is that in these lawsuits, shareholder plaintiffs almost
universally benefit from government investigations into the defendant firms’
misconduct against third parties.
In examining the parties in event-driven securities class actions, I find that the
majority of these lawsuits are brought by institutional investors (particularly pension
funds), and the top-tier plaintiffs’ lawyers that serve them. I also find that defendant
firms in these cases are generally much larger than those in cases where the primary
harm is to shareholders. This finding further confirms that event-driven lawsuits
are not a trivial phenomenon, and that the major players in securities class action
litigation are behind these lawsuits.
The first question to ask is whether these claims are meritorious. Many of
the characteristics shared by the event-driven cases in my sample—low dismissal
rates, high settlement values, government investigations, and institutional lead
plaintiffs—are often viewed as proxies for merit in the securities class action context
and used as such in the empirical literature. Should we then conclude that the
criticism directed against these cases is misplaced? Not so fast. First, the pressure
to settle in these lawsuits is intense, such that litigation outcomes may not
accurately proxy for the merits of the lawsuit. Second, institutional investors may
“cherry-pick” these lawsuits not because there was clearly investor fraud, but
because, thanks to the government investigations that accompany the vast majority
of them, bad facts are already public, and the defendants tend to have deep pockets.
Third, the non-SEC investigations (brought by regulators such as the EPA, the
FDA, and the NHTSA) that accompany these lawsuits may not constitute the same
“hard evidence” of investor fraud that SEC investigations do in the literature.
Accordingly, it is not clear that these characteristics necessarily signal meritorious
grounds for shareholder recovery in event-driven cases.
Next, I turn to the broader policy question. Irrespective of their benefits to
shareholders and their merits, do these lawsuits play a valuable role in deterring,
compensating, or monitoring firms’ externality of costs to third parties? First, with
respect to deterrence, it is possible that these cases may help discourage firms from
conduct that harms third parties. In fact, in about 20% of the event-driven cases in
my sample, there is a shareholder recovery where neither the harmed third party nor
any regulator recovered anything. Thus, it is possible that such event-driven
securities class actions may fill a gap by punishing misconduct that regulators and
direct victims cannot. However, some of these settlements may be for nuisance
value, and therefore, this finding is not conclusive.
Second, from a compensation standpoint, these lawsuits are clearly lacking.
These actions by definition do not compensate third parties who are victims of
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corporate misconduct, and much scholarly literature has argued that they do not
compensate shareholders very effectively either.10
Third, these lawsuits are arguably suboptimal as monitoring mechanisms to
curtail harm to third parties. To begin with, managers often externalize costs to third
parties (whether by shoddy manufacturing, false advertising, or negligent safety
measures) in order to bolster their company’s share price. Thus, shareholders may
actually prefer managers to pursue such misconduct as long as the odds of detection
are low. The high probability that a securities class action based on this misconduct
will be successful may reinforce this preference; shareholders may figure that if the
management is not caught, shares will increase in value, and if the management is
caught, they will be able to recoup at least some of their losses through settlements
after the fact. Furthermore, although litigation is a mechanism for shareholder
monitoring, event-driven securities class actions are suboptimal in this role because
they occur after millions of barrels of oil flood the Gulf, the new sports car bursts
into flame, or the contaminated Tylenol is in the medicine cabinet. And even as an
ex post enforcement mechanism, such lawsuits are inadequate because they often
do not incentivize disclosures that would be useful in monitoring a firms’ risk for
harming third parties. This is because under the existing securities regime, firms can
usually better escape liability either by being excessively vague about such risks, or
by saying nothing at all.11
Finally, I consider disclosure as a potential policy proposal to improve both
the deterrent and monitoring functions of event-driven securities class actions
lawsuits. Current policy proposals to address event-driven litigation (such as
recovery caps12) tend to be starkly all-or-nothing, and do not appear to take into
account the effect of these lawsuits on the outsiders that suffer direct harm from
the alleged misconduct. I propose several broad measures that could improve the
quality of the disclosures that are litigated in event-driven securities cases, such that
investors and the public at large are better aware of the risks that firms create. Such
reforms include the requirement of more specific operational risk and
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures.13 This proposal might be
advantageous not only for improving firms’ corporate citizenship and compliance
with the law, as some have argued,14 but could also improve the quality of these
10. See Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program
Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1243 ( 2014 ).
11. See Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow
of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967 (2019 ).
12. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONTAINING THE CONTAGION: PROPOSALS
TO REFORM THE BROKEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM 9 (2019 ) [ hereinafter CONTAINING
THE CONTAGION ].
13. This is consistent with recent commentary. See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure
Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923 (2019 ).
14. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A
Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy,
106 IOWA L. REV. 1885, 1889 ( 2021 ).
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lawsuits and their effectiveness in curbing harmful practices by increasing the utility
of the disclosures that event-driven securities class actions might enforce.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out institutional background and
prior literature, and presents the questions to be tested. Part III presents the data,
methodology, and results. Part IV assesses the desirability of event-driven securities
class actions and briefly evaluates policy implications.
I. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A. The Legal History of Securities Class Actions
The recent rise in event-driven securities litigation may itself be attributable,
at least in part, to the reforms undertaken to limit securities class actions generally.
Accordingly, before discussing event-driven litigation, it is useful to consider the
broader framework for these lawsuits.
Since the advent of the private right of action under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934,15 the purpose and method for preventing securities fraud
have provided fodder for generations of scholars. Many have challenged the
efficacy of private securities fraud lawsuits in optimally compensating victims or
deterring fraud.16 With the rise of the securities fraud class action17 came intense
debate over the benefit of such lawsuits, which many argued were excessive,
vexatious, and overly lawyer-driven.18 The ultimate result was the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which Congress passed in 1995 over President Bill
Clinton’s veto.19 In the PSLRA, Congress attempted to address the agency problems
in securities class actions by, among other measures, heightening pleading standards
for Exchange Act claims, imposing a discovery stay during pendency of motions to
dismiss, and presumptively awarding the lead plaintiff role to the plaintiff that
suffered the greatest loss from the alleged fraud.20
15. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964 ), abrogated on other grounds by Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 ( 2001 ); Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 ( E.D. Pa. 1946 ).
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 217 ( 1983 ); Bryant Garth, Ilene
H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical
Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 354 (1988 ); William W. Bratton & Michael
L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 ( 2011 ).
17. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 ( 1988 ).
18. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State
Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 469 ( 2011 ) ( “In 1995, Congress, in an effort to curb what it deemed
vexatious litigation, enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ( ‘PSLRA’ ).” ). For general
discussion of problems in securities litigation prior to the PSLRA, see generally Coffee, supra note 16;
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STAN. L. REV. 497, 570 ( 1991 ).
19. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
( codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C. ).
20. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 923–29.
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The PSLRA, in turn, spawned its own strand of literature, and controversy
continues over whether it was effective or desirable.21 The intent of the PSLRA was
twofold: (1) to reduce the role of plaintiffs’ lawyers in bringing and running these
lawsuits, sometimes to the detriment of the actual investors, and (2) to reduce strike
suits against public companies while allowing meritorious claims to proceed.22 Some
studies have found that following an initial dip,23 the PSLRA has not appeared to
reduce the number of securities class actions24 or the number of nuisance lawsuits.25
There is some evidence that the PSLRA has screened out non-nuisance
cases; however, this screening effect diminishes where cases involve so-called “hard
evidence” of fraud, such as earnings restatements or SEC investigations.26
One effect of the PSLRA’s discovery stay and heightened pleading standards
has been to augment the importance of government investigations in securities class
actions, and with them the well-known species of litigation known as the
“piggyback,” “coattail,” or “follow-on” lawsuit.27 In these lawsuits, private plaintiffs
seize on government investigations in order to capitalize on the government’s
factfinding.28 Meeting the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard without the
benefit of discovery, particularly for claims brought under Rule 10b-5 which require
specific allegations of scienter, demands a level of specificity29 that is at best, costly,
and at worst, impossible for plaintiffs to meet on their own. However, a government
investigation can give plaintiffs a leg up by making public the facts necessary for a

21. See generally, e.g., id.; Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 ( 2009 ) [ hereinafter
Pritchard et al., Screening Effect ]; Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter?
The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 869 ( 2005 ) [ hereinafter Choi, et al., Do Institutions Matter? ]; Amanda M. Rose,
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private
Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 ( 2008 ).
22. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995 ) ( Conf. Rep. ).
23. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s
Experience ( John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 140, 1997 ).
24. See Perino, supra note 20, at 915 ( “The best available evidence suggests that there are as
many, if not more, class actions filed annually after passage of the PSLRA as before.” ).
25. See Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, supra note
21, at 37 ( “We do not find statistically significant evidence that nuisance suits have been discouraged.” ).
26. Id. at 877.
27. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 761 ( 2003 ) ( “From their fear that the PSLRA will prematurely
extinguish meritorious suits, it is a short step to surmise that the plaintiffs’ bar will now have an even
keener interest in SEC enforcement actions because an enforcement action’s fruits include facts that
can support a class action’s complaint, thereby filling the current discovery void faced by the plaintiffs’
bar after the enactment of the PSLRA.” ).
28. See Coffee, supra note 16, at 228 ( describing how “the filing of the public agency’s action
serves as the starting gun for a race between private attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative
class action settlements, which public law enforcement has gratuitously presented them” ).
29. Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., 551 U.S. 308 ( 2007 ).
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successful complaint that plaintiffs would otherwise have difficulty gathering.30
There is, in general, a robust debate over the merits of these lawsuits; some
commentators argue that piggyback litigation extends the benefits of public
enforcement and protects against under-deterrence,31 while other scholars decry
such lawsuits as solely “multiplying wrongdoers’ penalties: [a plaintiffs’ lawyer]
provides no independent search skills, no special litigation savvy, and no
nonpoliticized incentives. She simply piles on and runs up the tab.”32
Irrespective of whether piggyback litigation is desirable in the securities
context, the existing literature suggests that it is often quite successful. Previous
studies have found that securities class action settlement amounts are higher and
litigants settle faster where there is a parallel SEC case, and that securities class
actions where there is a parallel SEC case are less likely to be dismissed.33 Such cases
may settle for higher amounts because they are more likely to be meritorious; the
resource-constrained SEC is less likely to investigate frivolous allegations, and
instead probably focuses its energy on credible, serious misconduct that harms
investors.34 Such investigations may provide a platform not only for securities
class actions, but for further shareholder litigation, such as derivative lawsuits,
against the company.35
B. “Event-Driven” Securities Litigation
But what if the shareholders did not get the worst of the company’s
misconduct? Many securities class actions accompany front-page disasters caused
by public firms. More often than not, the misconduct causing these disasters does
not target the misbehaving firm’s investors, but some other constituency.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has twice held that adverse events may for the
basis of a securities fraud class action, and a cursory look at headlines suggests that

30. See Coffee, supra note 16; Garth, supra note 16; Alexander I. Platt, “Gatekeeping” in the
Dark: SEC Control Over Private Securities Litigation Revisited, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 27 ( 2020 ).
31. See, e.g., id.; Garth, supra note 16; Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement,
69 VAND. L. REV. 285, 290 (2016 ) ( arguing for the merits of “redundant public-private enforcement” );
Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public
and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (2000 ) (“There is nothing
inherently troubling about private class actions that seek to benefit from successful government
litigation. Properly managed, such class actions offer a relatively fair and efficient mechanism for
extending the benefits of government legal work to provide redress to injured citizens.” ).
32. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2151 ( 2004 ).
33. Cox, Thomas, Kiki, supra note 27, at 763.
34. Id. Indeed, multiple studies use the presence of a parallel SEC investigation as a proxy for
the merit of a lawsuit. See infra note 65.
35. Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 49 ( 2011 ) [ hereinafter Erickson, Overlitigating].
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settlements to shareholders in these cases are substantial.36 The growing visibility of
these “event-driven” cases has sparked concern on the part of the defense bar,37
calls for reform by business,38 and increasing scholarly attention.39 Anecdotally,
defendant firms in such cases are large. Moreover, the front-page disasters giving
rise to lawsuits are often dogged by an alphabet soup of regulatory investigations,
which plaintiffs can use to surmount the heightened pleading requirements of the
PSLRA. Some of these disasters are the subject of parallel SEC investigations. The
SEC, after all, does not operate in a vacuum,40 and may join forces with other
regulators who are uninterested in the welfare of a company’s shareholders, but are
instead obligated to investigate harms to consumers, public health, competition, or
the environment. And indeed, some of these cases involve only inquiries by
non-securities regulators. Commentators have noted that these cases seem to be
increasingly common,41 and many have led to massive settlements.42

36. Some well-known examples from my dataset include BP, Johnson & Johnson, and Toyota.
See Rob Davies, BP to Pay $175m to Investors Over Deepwater Horizon Spill, GUARDIAN ( Feb. 14, 2018,
1:03 PM ), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/03/bp-compensate-investors-deepwaterhorizon-oil-spill#:~:text=BP%20has%20agreed%20to%20pay,Gulf%20of%20Mexico%20oil%20spill
[ https://perma.cc/YZ9A-89NK ]; Ken Bensinger, Toyota Settles Shareholder Lawsuit Related to
Sudden Acceleration, L.A. TIMES ( Nov. 14, 2012, 12:00 AM ), https://www.latimes.com/business/
la-xpm-2012-nov-14-la-fi-mo-toyota-shareholder-lawsuit-20121114-story.html [ https://perma.cc/
YYZ6-CPGT ]; Jessica Dye, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $22.9 Million to End Recall Lawsuit,
REUTERS ( July 17, 2013, 5:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-recall-settlementidUSBRE96H01S20130718 [ https://perma.cc/7QFD-PVU4 ].
37. See Reed & Lloyd, supra note 6, at 1–2 ( “The slack in decreased financial misstatement cases
appears to have been picked up by a new class of securities cases: event-driven claims. These are claims
filed in response to adverse company events such as a data security breach, sexual harassment
allegations, a catastrophic explosion, allegations that a drug or product has side effects or caused injury,
or a regulatory investigation or enforcement action.” ). But see Julie G. Reiser & Steven J. Toll,
Event-Driven Litigation Defense, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( May 23, 2019 ), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/23/event-driven-litigation-defense/ [ https://perma.cc/DSF5-P7JP ]
( “[ E]vent-driven cases serve as a deterrent to companies who might otherwise conceal or misrepresent
their operations because they recognize that investors will hold them accountable for doing so.” ).
38. See, e.g., Peter Feltman, U.S. Chamber Seeks Regulatory Review of ‘Event-Driven’ Securities
Lawsuits, CQ ROLL CALL ( Feb. 26, 2019 ), 2019 WL 925526 ( “Legal experts are skeptical about
the merits of these securities claims . . . [ b]ut they are powerful weapons for coercing settlements
because of the costs of defense and the reputational harm from ongoing litigation focused on such
adverse events.” ).
39. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation in 2017: “It Was the Best of Times, It Was
the Worst of Times,” CLS BLUE SKY BLOG ( Mar. 19, 2018 ), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/
03/19/securities-litigation-in-2017-it-was-the-best-of-times-it-was-the-worst-of-times/ [ https://perma.cc/
ZB5G-QVU8 ]; Klausner, Curry & Hegland, supra note 7.
40. See Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 274 ( 2020 ).
41. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 39; Nessim Mezrahi & Stephen Sigrist, Limiting the Severity of
Deficient Securities Fraud Claims, LAW360 ( Jan. 8, 2021, 4:45 PM ), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1342523/limiting-the-severity-of-deficient-securities-fraud-claims [ https://perma.cc/XJ98-K6NE ]
( “In 2018, Columbia Law School professor John C. Coffee Jr. indicated that the ‘scope of event-driven
litigation could expand rapidly,’ which it has . . . . ” ).
42. See, e.g., Mezrahi & Sigrist, supra note 41 ( citing the BP, Signet Jewelers and Equifax
settlements of recent of 2017, 2019, and 2020 respectively ).
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Many in the industry have been intensely critical of such lawsuits. The
president of the Chubb Group, which provides, among other products, D&O
insurance, recently stated:
[T]he class benefitting most from such litigation is not shareholders. Rather,
the real winner is a growing cohort of lawyers who are filing meritless lawsuits in
federal and state courts across the United States every time . . . a corporate
misfortune impacts a company’s share price . . . . In the last five years, half of the
nearly $23 billion in securities claims costs have gone to lawyers—both plaintiff
and defense.43
He is not alone in the assessment that event-driven cases are generally lacking
in merit but create the opportunity for plaintiffs’ lawyers to extract large settlements
that are increasingly threatening to firms.44 The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform (the “Institute”) published two white papers arguing that “the legitimacy of
[event-driven litigation is] suspect.”45 Specifically, it argues that such claims often
follow a “file first, investigate later” model, and often lack sufficient allegations of
materiality and scienter.46 Nonetheless, it contends these claims generate severe
pressure to settle because “[t]he plaintiffs’ lawyer will focus on the underlying
adverse event—and only tangentially on the alleged false statement or omission that
occurred months or years earlier—which will keep the adverse event in the public
eye, even if the company has settled any legal claims arising out of that event.”47
There is little middle ground among the current policy prescriptions for
event-driven litigation, with issuers, their counsel, and insurers on one side, and
plaintiffs’ lawyers, unsurprisingly, on the other. The most concrete proposal for
decreasing the incidence of event-driven securities class actions has been promoted
by the Institute, which argues that “courts have been slow to react to the
event-driven cases . . . [and] do not appear to have recognized the differences
between these suits and traditional securities fraud claims or to have developed tools
for quickly weeding out unjustified claims.”48 The Institute first recommended that
the SEC develop a policy paper outlining standards for materiality, scienter and loss
causation in event-driven securities class actions, and use it as the basis for amicus

43. CHUBB, FROM NUISANCE TO MENACE: THE RISING TIDE OF SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION ( 2019 ), https://www.chubb.com/content/dam/chubb-sites/chubb-com/
ca-en/microsites/rims/documents/pdf/from-nuisance-to-menace--the-rising-tide-of-scas--chubb.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/G7HT-XYCS ].
44. See, e.g., Feltman, supra note 38 (“Legal experts are skeptical about the merits of these
securities claims . . . [ b ]ut they are powerful weapons for coercing settlements because of the costs of
defense and the reputational harm from ongoing litigation focused on such adverse events.” ).
45. CONTAINING THE CONTAGION, supra note 12.
46. Id. at 10; see also Coffee, supra note 39 ( noting that the reasoning of complaints alleging
scienter in some event-driven cases “seems strained” ).
47. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, A RISING THREAT: THE NEW CLASS
ACTION RACKET THAT HARMS INVESTORS AND THE ECONOMY 14 (2018 ).
48. CONTAINING THE CONTAGION, supra note 12, at 2.
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briefs to help courts analyze (and presumably, speedily dispose of) these lawsuits.49
The Institute also recommended that Congress require more careful scrutiny of fee
awards, provide interlocutory review of denials of motions to dismiss, and adopt a
damages cap.50
Conversely, other stakeholders, particularly plaintiffs’ lawyers, have argued
emphatically against curbing event-driven litigation on the basis that “frequently
investors are also injured when a corporation misrepresents the risks associated
with its operations.”51 They blast the Institute’s “reli[ance] on circular logic to
conclude that unexpected events are, by definition, unexpected,” arguing that
event-driven lawsuits have, in fact, uncovered evidence that the defendant firm
concealed significant risks and adverse events from their shareholders.52 They
further argue that no reforms are necessary, as judges under the current regime “are
more than capable of weeding out the weak cases from the strong and, as historic
mega-settlements show, the strong ones should proceed.”53
C. Hypothesis Development
As the incidence of event-driven securities class actions appears to have
increased and the commentary around it has become more common and heated, it
would seem prudent to guide policy decisions on these lawsuits with data. However,
although there has been some examination of so-called “stock-drop” securities class
actions,54 there has been little, if any, methodological study of the prevalence and
attributes of event-driven securities class actions. In this paper I attempt to fill this
gap by answering some basic questions about these cases, so far as the information
is available. How often do shareholders sue firms when the alleged corporate
misconduct harmed others more directly? Is there a difference in dismissal rates and
settlement values when a third party is the primary victim of the firm’s conduct? If
so, are government investigations the primary channel for this effect, and if so,
which ones? Do these cases, as headlines imply, involve primarily large defendant
firms? Who are the plaintiffs and their lawyers in these lawsuits? What other
characteristics do these lawsuits share? And finally, to the extent the information is
available, how do shareholder recoveries in these cases compare with what the
government and the primary victims recover for the same conduct? Answering
these questions can help inform a policy debate around event-driven securities
class actions.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18–19.
Reiser & Toll, supra note 37.
Id.
Id.
See Klausner, Curry & Hegland, supra note 7.
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II. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS
A. Sources and Coding
To test these questions, I use a sample comprised of securities class action
cases from 2010 to 2015 from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(SSCAC).55 I omit from the sample lawsuits against financial, services, and utility
firms, and drop lawsuits that were remanded to state court. I also drop all so-called
“merger objection” cases,56 on the basis that claims in these cases are recognized to
be different from other types of securities class actions.
Using the most recent amended complaint in each action, I manually code
these lawsuits with an indicator variable that equals “1” if the alleged misconduct in
the case primarily harmed the firm’s shareholders. For example, a case in which the
management knew it would be unable to meet its own rosy projections at the time
they were made would be coded “1.” In this instance, shareholders attempting to
value their own investments are clearly the population most directly harmed by the
misstatement. By contrast, a case where an auto manufacturer was alleged to have
knowingly used batteries in its cars that burst into flame some percent of the time57
would be coded “0,” because the most direct victims of the misconduct are not the
shareholders, but the drivers whose cars risk conflagration. Another example might
be Drug Company A, which was sued for alleged misstatements about the probable
FDA approval of a drug in clinical trials. If the FDA declined to approve the drug
citing severe side effects, the case would be coded “1” because the primary victims
of the misstatement are the firm’s shareholders who bought their stock in reliance
on the company’s assurance that the drug would be approved. In this scenario,
patients cannot be harmed by the misstatements because the drug is not yet on the
market. However, if plaintiffs alleged that Drug Company B failed to heed the
FDA’s warning about dangerous side effects for a drug already on the market, the
case would be coded “0” because the primary victims of the misconduct are the
patients taking the drug, and thus risking or suffering the side effects. Hereinafter,
I refer to cases coded “1” and alleging conduct primarily harming shareholders as
“SH” cases. Cases coded “0” and alleging misconduct more directly harming other
victims are referred to as “OV” or “event-driven” cases.58

55. Stan. L. Sch., supra note 8. Although there is later data available, many actions beyond 2015
are still ongoing, and could bias the results.
56. See Coffee, supra note 39 ( suggesting that these cases migrated from Delaware to the federal
courts as Delaware case law increasingly restricted the disclosure-only settlements that often accompany
such cases ).
57. See In re Tesla Motors Inc. Sec. Litig., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1034 ( N.D. Cal. 2014 ).
58. There is some definitional confusion around the term “event-driven litigation.” See
Reiser & Toll, supra note 37 ( arguing that “event-driven litigation describes almost any securities fraud
action that does not arise from an accounting restatement” ). However, the term generally appears
to refer to securities litigation that follows catastrophic events which cause harm to a potentially wide
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None of this is to say that shareholders are not harmed in cases where, for
example, car batteries explode. It is quite true that the stock price of the car
company will likely drop when the explosions become public, injuring the firm’s
investors.59 If the car company’s management makes a material misstatement or
omits information it was obligated to disclose in order to minimize the incidents or
prevent share value from falling, these misstatements or omissions are actionable
under federal securities laws. However, it is difficult to dispute that the victims most
negatively impacted by the core misconduct—the knowing manufacture and
distribution of cars that could explode—are the drivers of those cars, rather than
the company’s shareholders.
The sample contains a total of 487 cases, decreasing to 399 after I drop merger
challenges. Of these 399 cases, 373 involve Section 10(b) claims and 48 involve
Section 11 claims. Based on the most recent complaint in each lawsuit, I code each
case according to whether the alleged misconduct most directly harmed
shareholders or some other victim. I code 66 cases as primarily harming other
victims, which amounts to 16.5% of the sample. In addition to coding whether the
alleged misconduct primarily harmed shareholders, I record whether the action was
dismissed and the shareholder settlement amount, if there is one, from documents
on the SSCAC or PACER.
To better evaluate the correlation of dismissal rates and settlement amounts
with the primary victim of the alleged misconduct, I also gather information on firm
size, class period duration, the circuit in which the lawsuit was brought, whether a
lead plaintiff was an institutional investor, the plaintiffs’ law firms, whether the firm
restated its financials in the class period, and whether the firm was subject to an
SEC or other investigation during the class period. It is possible that settlement
amounts are correlated with the size of the firm; as a proxy for firm size, I use
information on firms’ total assets60 from Compustat.61 Settlements may also be
larger where the class period is longer and therefore projected damages amounts are
higher;62 I source class period information, measured in months, from the SSCAC.
Additionally, judicial expertise in securities litigation may impact dismissal rate or
settlement amount. I therefore include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lawsuit

array of non-shareholder victims. The OV label is meant to capture this litigation, and I use the
terms interchangeably.
59. And indeed, if this is not the case, the shareholders cannot demonstrate loss causation or
damages, and thus have no claim under the securities laws. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 ( 2005 ).
60. See James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. REV. 547,
571 ( 2013 ); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355,
368 (2008 ).
61. See Compustat, WHARTON RSCH. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/
[ https://perma.cc/J42S-RXCM ] ( last visited Sept. 8, 2022 ).
62. Id.
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was brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits, which are commonly considered to
be the most expert.63
Dismissal rates and settlement amounts may also be correlated with the
probable merit of each lawsuit. Following numerous empirical studies of securities
class actions, I use the presence of an institutional investor as lead plaintiff, the
presence of financial restatements by the firm during the class period, and the
presence of a parallel SEC inquiry as indicia of merit.64 I code information on lead
plaintiffs from court documents on the SSCAC and PACER. I gather information
on earnings restatements from Audit Analytics.65 I include only restatements
indicating fraud or misrepresentation, rather than errors or changes in accounting
rules.66 Finally, I use a dummy variable to code whether the plaintiffs cited an SEC
investigation in the most recent amended complaint. Cases in which an SEC
investigation was cited were coded “1” using this dummy even if other regulatory
investigations were also cited. I also used an additional dummy variable to code if
plaintiffs cited other regulatory investigations without the presence of an SEC
investigation. Accordingly, cases coded “1” for SEC investigations may involve
other regulators, but cases coded “1” for non-SEC investigations do not involve the
SEC. Finally, I gather data from the SSCAC on plaintiff law firms and use a dummy
variable equal to 1 to code where any of the plaintiff law firms appears in the Legal
500’s list of the top fifteen securities class action plaintiff firms.67
Further, for the OV lawsuits, I examine court filings and press reports to
determine whether there was a regulatory penalty paid, and if so, how much. In
addition, for OV lawsuits, I do a press search to see if the primary victims sued the
firm, and if so, whether and how much they recovered.
B. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Analysis
The majority of lawsuits in my sample—roughly 83.5%—are SH cases and
involve alleged misconduct that appears to target shareholders specifically.
Accordingly, most securities class actions do seem to be brought in response to

63. Park, supra note 60, at 571; see also James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do
Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and
Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 430–38.
64. See Park, supra note 60, at 562; Choi et al., supra note 21, at 872; Pritchard, et al., supra note
21, at 41.
65. See Audit Analytics, WHARTON RSRCH. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/
pages/about/data-vendors/audit-analytics-and-oia-other-independent-audits/ [ https://perma.cc/
923M-4BDE ] ( last visited Sept. 8, 2022 ).
66. See Choi et al., supra note 21.
67. See Securities Litigation: Plaintiff, LEGAL 500, https://www.legal500.com/c/united-states/
dispute-resolution/securities-litigation-plaintiff/ [ https://perma.cc/9RSX-7Y9U ] ( last visited Sept.
8, 2022 ). The relevant firms that appear in my sample are Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP, Labaton Sucharow LLP, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP,
Pomerantz LLP, and Bernstein Liebhard LLP.
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misconduct that directly harms investors rather than in response to any corporate
wrongdoing. However, the 16.5% of cases which are OV cases—involving
misconduct that more directly harms victims who are not investors—reveal some
interesting trends. In this Section, I compare dismissal rates, settlement amounts,
and other characteristics for SH and OV cases.
1. Descriptive Statistics
SH and OV lawsuits differ along some key dimensions. Table 1 shows
descriptive statistics for SH versus OV lawsuits, omitting merger objection cases.
First, I find that OV lawsuits are less likely to be dismissed and result in higher
settlement values than SH lawsuits. In my sample, nearly 55% of SH cases are
dismissed. By contrast, roughly 36% of OV cases are dismissed. Similarly, the OV
lawsuits settle on average for higher amounts. The average settlement amount for
SH cases is $7.2 million. The average settlement amount for OV cases is more than
triple that amount, $24.3 million.
These sets of cases diverge in other potentially important ways. Defendant
firms in OV cases tend to be much larger, as measured by their total assets; these
firms average $29.6 billion in total assets the year prior to the lawsuit. By contrast,
SH firms average $8 billion. Moreover, the average class period for OV lawsuits is
four months longer than for SH lawsuits, potentially increasing the damages for
which defendants could be liable. Nearly 70% of OV lawsuits have an institutional
investor as a lead plaintiff, compared with only 42% of SH lawsuits. Further, roughly
85% of OV cases involve a Legal 500 plaintiffs’ law firm, where only 57% of the
SH cases do. Finally, perhaps the most striking difference between the SH and OV
cases in my sample are the government investigations associated with each. SEC
investigations appeared in SH and OV complaints with similar frequency, 19% and
17% of the time respectively. However over 70% of OV cases cited only inquiries
or actions by non-SEC regulators, while only 4% of SH cases cited such inquiries.
Nearly 90% of complaints for OV lawsuits cited some government investigation.
Other characteristics, however, do not seem appreciably different for these
two types of cases. Both types are brought with slightly more frequency in the
Second and Ninth Circuits, with 54% of SH cases and 52% of OV cases appearing
there. Roughly 4% of both types of cases involve defendant companies that restated
their financials during the class period.
In Table 3, I show descriptive statistics for the sample cases based on whether
and what kind of government investigation was cited in the complaint. As discussed
above, cases in which there was an SEC investigation are coded as such even if
other regulators were conducting a parallel investigation with the SEC. Cases in
which there was an SEC investigation have a lower dismissal rate than those with a
non-SEC investigation, but both have significantly lower dismissal rates than cases
in which no investigation was cited. Median settlements for SEC and non-SEC
investigation cases are similar, at $31 million and $28.6 million respectively. The
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class periods for SEC and non-SEC investigation cases are likewise very similar.
However, the median total assets for non-SEC investigation defendant firms are
more than twice the amount of that of SEC investigation defendant firms. Finally,
non-SEC investigation lawsuits have a somewhat higher percentage of institutional
investor lead plaintiffs than SEC investigation lawsuits.
To assess the possibility that institutional investors are “cherry-picking”
non-SEC investigation cases,68 I show in Table 4 descriptive statistics for sample
cases based on whether at least one lead plaintiff was an institutional investor. In
my sample, as in prior studies,69 institutional investor lead plaintiffs are associated
with lower dismissal probability and dramatically higher settlement values. They also
generally appear to sue much larger firms. Moreover, institutional investor lead
plaintiffs in my sample cite government investigations in their complaints much
more frequently than individual lead plaintiffs do, at 39% and 24% respectively.
However, there does not appear to be a dramatic distinction by institutional
investors between citing SEC and non-SEC investigations.
Finally, in Table 5, I break down the OV cases in my sample based on the type
of misconduct underlying the lawsuit. Of the 68 OV cases in my sample,70 33 are
based on underlying misconduct involving faulty drugs or medical devices.71
Roughly 30% of these cases were dismissed, and the average shareholder settlement
was $24.5 million. An additional 11 cases involve allegations of abusive or deceptive
practices involving medical facilities or services, such as physical or occupational
therapy, pharmacies, or nursing homes. While 36.4% of these cases were dismissed,
the average settlement was significantly lower, at $8.2 million. Eight of my OV cases
were based on misconduct involving the environment, such as oil spills, inadequate
pollution systems, and improper disposal of toxic materials. Fifty percent of these
cases were dismissed, and the average settlement was $26.4 million. I note that the
average firm size (based on mean total assets) of the defendant firms in
environmental OV cases was, at $61.6 billion, triple or quadruple the size of the
next largest category of firms and twice the average size of all OV defendant firms.
Four of the OV cases reflect misconduct relating to motor vehicles, including
exploding batteries, uncontrollable acceleration, and other manufacturing and
design flaws. Only 25% of these cases were dismissed, and the average settlement
was roughly four times larger than the next largest average OV settlement by type,

68. For a discussion of cherry-picking by some institutional investors, see Choi et al., supra note
21, at 872.
69. See Cox et al., supra note 60, at 371.
70. In this count, to present the most inclusive picture of these cases with a small sample, I
include two cases that are brought as proxy fraud claims but where the underlying misconduct is based
on harm to non-shareholder parties.
71. The prevalence of this type of litigation is consistent with the observations of other
commentators, who have noted a rise in securities class actions against pharmaceutical and medical
device companies in recent years. See Coffee, supra note 39 ( finding that such cases accounted for
twenty percent of securities class actions in 2017 ).
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at $109 million. The remaining cases are based on a smorgasbord of misconduct,
including that relating to consumers (largely false advertising), antitrust, food and
beverage, hazardous working conditions, sexual harassment, and miscellaneous.72
These remaining categories have higher dismissal rates, between 50% and 100%.
They also have lower average settlements, between $0 and $11.3 million.
2. Empirical Analysis
To assess whether OV cases have lower dismissal rates and higher settlement
amounts based on their status as such or on some other characteristic, I use
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Because the vast majority of OV cases
involve Section 10(b) claims, I report below the results of the regressions using only
the cases in the sample that involve such claims.
Table 6 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Dismiss
Dummy, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the case was dismissed.73 OV Case is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the case is coded as an OV case. Log Assets is the log
of the total assets of the firm measured in millions of dollars. Class Period Months is
the class period of the lawsuit measured in months. 2nd or 9th Circuit is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the lawsuit was brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits.
Institutional LP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff in the
lawsuit is an institutional investor. Restatement is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
defendant firm restated its financials during the class period and the restatement
involved a misrepresentation or fraud, rather than an error or change in accounting
rules. SEC Action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an SEC inquiry, investigation,
or enforcement action involving the alleged misconduct was cited in the most recent
complaint. All regressions use robust standard errors.
Table 6 shows that lawsuits classified as OV cases are roughly 20% less likely
than SH cases to be dismissed. This finding is consistent across specifications and
significant at the 5% level. Firm size is also a statistically significant predictor
of dismissal. Conversely, the length of the class period is negatively associated
with dismissal (though the results are weaker). Table 5 shows that the presence
of an institutional investor as lead plaintiff and especially the presence of a parallel
SEC investigation are predictors that a securities class action will survive a motion
to dismiss.
Table 7 reports the results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable,
Log Shareholder Settlement, is the log of the amount for which the securities class
action settled plus 1. All other variables are the same as those defined in Table 5.
72. This category includes cases where the misconduct is difficult to characterize. For example,
in Kasper v. AAC Holdings, Inc., the complaint is based on allegations that a manager committed
dependent adult abuse and second-degree murder. See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws, Kasper v. AAC Holdings, Inc., No. 15-cv-00923 ( M.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2015 ),
2015 WL 5012605.
73. I obtain similar results when I estimate the coefficients using a logistic model.
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Here, I find that OV cases are associated with dramatically higher settlement
values. This finding is significant at the 5% level.74 Firm size is also a statistically
significant predictor of lower settlements in securities class actions.75 The length
of the class period is associated with increased settlement amounts. Consistent
with previous studies, I find that the presence of an institutional investor as lead
plaintiff and the presence of a parallel SEC investigation are predictors of higher
settlement amounts.76
To test the intuition that the lower dismissal probabilities and higher
settlement values of the OV cases are driven by the non-SEC investigations that
frequently accompany them, I run the same regressions using the Non-SEC Action
dummy instead of the OV Case dummy.77 Tables 8 and 9 show these regressions. I
find that dismissal probability is negatively associated with a non-SEC action, and
settlement value is positively correlated, echoing the results from the regressions
using the OV Case dummy. One reason that the results are not identical may be that
while the vast majority of OV cases involve investigations by non-SEC regulators,
some involve SEC investigations in addition to those of other regulators and are
therefore coded as SEC investigation cases.
Finally, the descriptive statistics in my sample suggest that institutional
investors are lead plaintiffs in most OV cases and that they cite government
investigations in their complaints at a higher rate than individual plaintiffs. Table 10
shows the results of OLS regressions, testing the relationship between whether a
lead plaintiff is an institutional investor and other relevant variables. I find that,
controlling for firm size and class period, designation as an OV case predicts an
institutional investor as lead plaintiff. However, no investigations of any kind
predict an institutional investor lead plaintiff at a statistically significant level.78

74. In unreported regressions, I regress Dismiss Dummy and Log Shareholder Settlement
respectively on OV cases broken down into two types: healthcare-related and non-healthcare-related.
The coefficients for the healthcare-related OV cases are very similar across specifications to those that
I report for OV Cases and are significant at the 5% level. The coefficients for non-healthcare-related
OV cases are similar in direction though slightly lower in magnitude, but are not statistically significant.
However, t-statistics in the specifications with controls are relatively high, and it is likely that the results
are not statistically significant because the sample is small and I use robust standard errors.
75. A potential reason for this may be that large firms can hire more prestigious and expensive
defense counsel.
76. See Cox et al., supra note 27, at 767.
77. Since the DOJ criminally prosecutes violations of the federal securities laws, I carefully
scrutinized DOJ involvement in the sample cases. Only one case cited a DOJ investigation for
misconduct targeting investors without a concurrent SEC investigation. Because the DOJ was
prosecuting in this instance on behalf of investors, I coded this as an SEC investigation case.
78. In particular, unlike Cox et al., supra note 60, at 377, I do not find that an SEC investigation
is a statistically significant predictor of an institutional investor as lead plaintiff.
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III. ARE EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS DESIRABLE?
As previously discussed, event-driven securities class actions have prompted
increasing scholarly and industry discussion of late. Some commentators believe
that, like other securities class actions, there are good cases and bad cases, but
nothing renders event-driven cases uniquely problematic.79 A question implicit in
this viewpoint is whether the distinction between event-driven securities class
actions and other securities class actions is even a viable one for policy purposes.
On the other side of the debate are those who consider event-driven securities class
actions both unique and problematic, driven largely by unfortunate circumstances,
opportunistic plaintiffs, and pressure to settle.80
In this Section, I examine whether event-driven securities class actions are
desirable. After addressing the threshold question of why it is insufficient to address
this question simply on the basis of whether shareholders are defrauded, I examine
whether these lawsuits are, by and large, meritorious. These cases display several
features that are frequently cited in the literature as “indicia of merit”—specifically,
they have lower dismissal rates and settle for higher amounts, they frequently
involve an institutional investor, and a large majority involve a government
investigation. In drilling down on these features, however, it is not clear that these
attributes are unambiguous proxies for merit in the context of event-driven
securities class actions. I then examine these cases from a broader policy perspective
to assess whether the cases serve a valuable role in deterring, compensating, or
monitoring corporate misconduct against outsiders.
A. Recovery of Secondary Victims and the Utility of the Shareholder Harm/Other
Victim Framework
A threshold question is whether the distinction between shareholder class
actions based on misconduct that harms primarily shareholders or more directly
harms other victims matters to any analysis of these cases. Just because shareholders
are secondary victims, why shouldn’t they recover? And if shareholders in a given
case, though they are secondary victims, are defrauded and thus entitled to recover,
why should that not end the inquiry as to whether these cases are desirable? The
answer is that in practice, there is usually extraordinary ambiguity in these cases
about whether the shareholders were defrauded. This ambiguity arises from both
conceptual and pragmatic sources.
First, in a given event-driven securities class action, it is very often factually
unclear whether or not the shareholders were wronged by the company. This is in
part because the pressure for defendant firms to settle in any securities class action
is intense, and it is impossible to say for certain how many shareholders recover for
good, as opposed to meritless, claims. Although the PSLRA was intended to
79.
80.

See, e.g., Reiser & Toll, supra note 37.
See, e.g., Reed & Lloyd, supra note 37.
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eliminate meritless strike suits, it did not succeed; various studies have shown that
nuisance settlements still appear to be pervasive in this area.81 Claimed damages in
securities class actions are often massive, and although the likelihood of success may
be low for plaintiffs, defendants are often not willing to risk losing these “bet
the company” lawsuits.82 Moreover, the burden of expensive discovery falls
overwhelmingly on defendants in securities class actions, and many may rationally
choose to settle early rather than go through discovery in order to dismiss the case.83
The pressure to settle even claims with a low probability of success is
compounded in event-driven cases for several reasons. First, such firms are typically
fighting battles on multiple fronts. In addition to claims from its shareholders, a
defendant firm in an OV case is likely to be dealing with a regulatory inquiry or
enforcement action. This is not specific to OV cases, as SH cases may also involve
investigations, usually by the SEC. However, OV defendants must contend with a
third set of adversaries: the direct victims of its misconduct. Although some lawsuits
by direct victims may be amenable to consolidation and a generally more efficient
process, many involve geographically and situationally diverse plaintiffs that bring
multiple class actions or their own individual claims. In putting out these fires, a
defendant firm might not have the resources to devote to battling out a shareholder
lawsuit of even unclear merit, particularly when doing so will likely keep the initial
misconduct in the news cycle and the stock price depressed. Moreover, an adverse
ruling or bad facts from a parallel proceeding could provide collateral estoppel to
any other plaintiffs, raising overall costs significantly.
Further, the application of 10b-5 jurisprudence in event-driven securities cases
has been inconsistent, leading to great uncertainty for defendants. To be liable to
shareholders for nondisclosure of the risks that often lead to OV disasters, courts
typically require “active rather than passive concealment and thus, literally,
wordplay: there is no antifraud-based duty to disclose risks unless and until the
issuer has said enough to put the particular kind of risk ‘in play.’ But when that is,
and why, flummoxes [judges].”84 Different judges’ decisions under these
81. See Jessica Erickson, Investing in Corporate Procedure, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1367, 1381 ( 2019 )
( “Low-dollar settlements . . . are seen in a sizable minority of securities class actions.” ); Laarni T. Bulan,
Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2016 Review and Analysis,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( Apr. 18, 2017 ) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/
04/18/securities-class-action-settlements-2016-review-and-analysis/ [ https://perma.cc/23P6-F94L ]
( finding that 25% of securities class actions settle for less than $2 million ).
82. See Erickson, supra note 81, at 1382–83 ( “Potential damages in securities class actions can
easily rise to hundreds of millions of dollars, which means that these suits can become ‘bet the company’
lawsuits. In such low-probability suits involving the potential for large verdicts, defendants are often
risk-averse. As a result, they are often willing to settle meritless claims to avoid . . . risking the company’s
financial stability.” ).
83. Id. at 1383 ( “[ D ]efendants make the rational cost-benefit calculation that it is cheaper to
settle the case and pay the plaintiff’s fees than go through discovery and then get the case dismissed.” ).
84. Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow of
a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967 ( 2019 ) ( noting that 10b-5 liability in these cases typically
arises under the half-truth doctrine ).
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circumstances, even when based on the same set of facts, can lead to dramatically
different results,85 and in the interest of avoiding this uncertainty, defendants may
be more inclined to settle early.
Finally, and more broadly, using whether shareholders were actually defrauded
as the measuring stick for whether OV cases are desirable is problematic because
liability in class actions under 10b-5 is not, strictly speaking, fraud. Few would object
in other areas of law to compensating a victim who was actually defrauded with
respect to an act that more directly harmed someone else. But in 10b-5 class actions,
plaintiffs need not prove reliance so long as the securities at issue traded in an
efficient market.86 This means that shareholders, as indirect victims, can be
compensated for a reduction in the value of their shares as a result of the harms that
their firms inflict on third parties without having ever become aware of an
actionable misstatement or omission. Accordingly, it seems inapposite to define the
merits of OV lawsuits solely by whether shareholders were defrauded.87
Factually, shareholders may not be defrauded in many of the cases in which
they nonetheless extract settlements because the pressure on securities class action
defendants in general, and on OV defendants in particular, is extremely high. And
conceptually, shareholders are arguably not defrauded in these actions because
they need not—and generally do not—rely on any misstatement or omission.
Accordingly, the sole metric for the desirability of event-driven class actions cannot
be whether shareholders were in fact defrauded. The SH/OV distinction provides
a different metric for assessing event-driven litigation by looking at its effect on
third parties.
B. Do “Indicia of Merit” Indicate Merit?
By many measures currently used in the literature, the OV cases in my sample
are meritorious cases. They are dismissed at lower rates than SH cases and they
settle for considerably higher amounts,88 most involve institutional shareholders,89
and the striking majority involve government investigations. In this Section, I
evaluate each of these “indicia of merit” in the context of event-driven litigation.
First, if the metric for merit is a relatively successful litigation outcome such
as survival of a motion to dismiss or a settlement, it appears, based on my results,
that event-driven cases are generally meritorious. But as just discussed, although
settlements take place “in the shadow of a judgment,” the intensity of the pressure

85. Id. at 4–5 ( describing, as an example, the divergent treatment of securities litigation arising
from the Fundao dam disaster by two different courts ).
86. Id.
87. Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 555 ( 2011 ).
88. C.S. Agnes Cheng, Henry He Huang, Yinghua Li & Gerald Lobo, Institutional Monitoring
Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 357 ( 2010 ).
89. Park, supra note 60.
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to settle securities class actions in general, and event-driven cases in particular,
should make us cautious about fully embracing this metric.90
The second potential indicator of merit that the OV cases in my sample display
is the involvement of an institutional investor as a lead plaintiff. The descriptive
statistics show that institutional investors are lead plaintiffs in roughly 42% of SH
cases, but nearly 70% of OV cases. Further, a top plaintiffs’ law firm is involved
with 56% of SH cases, but a whopping 85% of OV cases.91 I further examine the
lead plaintiffs of OV cases in my sample to see specifically which institutional
investors are most likely to bring these lawsuits. Table 11 shows the institutional
investor lead plaintiffs in the OV cases broken down by type. Many cases have
multiple lead plaintiffs; all are counted here. The majority of OV cases in my
sample—60%—have at least one lead plaintiff that is a pension fund, and pension
funds account for roughly 85% of the total number of institutional investor lead
plaintiffs who bring OV cases. It is perhaps unsurprising that pension funds should
make up the majority of OV lead plaintiffs; recent commentators have described
pension funds as the “sheriffs of Wall Street,”92 who are much less reluctant to
litigate securities class actions than virtually any other kind of institutional investor.93
Copious prior literature has found that institutional investors are associated
with better litigation outcomes,94 and the presence of an institutional investor as a
lead plaintiff is used in some studies as a proxy for the merit of a lawsuit.95 However,
previous studies also suggest that institutional investors might “cherry-pick” the
strongest cases with the largest defendants.96 My data on event-driven cases is
consistent with this hypothesis, suggesting that many defendant firms in OV

90. See supra Section III.B.
91. This is not surprising, as prior literature has documented the repeat relationships of
institutional investors with top-tier plaintiffs’ law firms. See Coffee, supra note 39 ( noting that
established plaintiffs’ firms dominate relationships with institutional investors ); see also Stephen J. Choi
& Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade after the
PLSRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1529 ( 2006 ) ( finding that “institutional investors that potentially
may act as lead plaintiffs tend to develop repeat relationships with only a handful of the top-tier plaintiff
law firms” ). The data from my sample is at least facially inconsistent with the more recent hypothesis
of commentators suggesting that event-driven litigation is primarily promulgated by less established
plaintiffs’ firms that lack these relationships with institutional investors, although I note that this
commentary largely post-dates the filing of the cases in my sample. See Coffee, supra note 39; Reed
& Lloyd, supra note 37.
92. See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST
BEST WEAPON 45, 171 ( 2018 ).
93. Cox et al., supra note 60, at 368 ( “The institutional lead plaintiffs in our cases are mostly
pension funds, either public pension funds or labor union pension funds.” ).
94. Choi et al., supra note 21; James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587,
1588 ( 2006 ).
95. Park, supra note 60.
96. Pritchard et al. supra note 21 ( finding specifically that pension funds are more likely to be
lead plaintiffs in cases with better evidence of fraud, such as SEC investigations or earnings restatements
with greater projected damages ).
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lawsuits are attractive litigation targets. A look at the descriptive statistics reveals
some interesting trends. First, recall that 88% of OV cases involve a government
inquiry or action and that 71% involve only non-SEC actions. There appears to be
a hierarchy among these different types of investigations with respect to litigation
outcomes. Cases involving an SEC inquiry have the lowest dismissal rates and the
highest settlements. Next in line are the cases involving a non-SEC action. And
while these do not result in dismissal rates or settlements as favorable as SEC
actions, they are more likely to produce plaintiff-favorable results than cases with
no investigations at all. Second, the defendant firms in cases involving non-SEC
investigations tend to be large. While the median assets of SEC action firms
are comparable to those where there is no government action ($534 million and
$489 million respectively), the median assets of the non-SEC action firms are more
than double at roughly $1.3 billion.
These figures suggest that while plaintiffs might select small and large
defendant firms to sue when the firms are the subject of an SEC inquiry, they
choose only large firms that are the subject of a non-SEC inquiry. A possible
rationale for this is the potential trade-off between the probability and magnitude
of a successful litigation outcome. A case involving a non-SEC action is not as likely
as one involving an SEC action to yield a plaintiff-friendly outcome—but if
plaintiffs select only large firms experiencing non-SEC investigations, the payoff is
potentially great, even if the likelihood of success is somewhat lower. It is also
noteworthy that OV cases tend to have longer class periods, further increasing
claimed damages in these lawsuits (and thus, settlement amounts). Another
contributing factor may be publicity; large firms that cause significant harm to third
parties are often subject to significant media attention, and therefore plaintiffs’
lawyers may incur fewer monitoring costs to find these cases in the first instance.97
These results suggest possible plaintiff opportunism and are consistent with
patterns recognized by previous scholarship finding that securities plaintiffs’
lawyers invest more time in cases against large defendants, and frequently capitalize
on bad facts that are publicly available, such as restatements, investigations, and the
termination of senior officers, in effort to reap larger fees with less effort.98 Other
recent accounts of event-driven securities litigation similarly find that the likelihood
of a securities class action following a drop in stock price increases with the size of
the defendant firm, even as the relative size of the stock drop decreases, likewise

97. See A Rising Threat, supra note 47, at 14 ( noting that event-driven securities class actions
keep catastrophic events “in the public eye” ).
98. Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson & A.C. Pritchard, Working Hard or Making Work?
Plaintiffs’ Attorney Fees in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 17 J. Empirical Legal Studs. 438, 441 ( 2020 );
see also STEPHEN J. CHOI, JESSICA ERICKSON & ADAM C. PRITCHARD, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, RISK AND REWARD: THE SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION LOTTERY 2 ( 2019 )
( noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers are “packaging publicly-available information [ on firm size and
investigations ] into a complaint that is highly likely to generate a settlement” ).
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suggesting that these cases are driven, at least in part, by plaintiff opportunism.99
The attractiveness of OV defendants as litigation targets may mean that there is
significant competition for the role of lead plaintiff, and institutional investors are,
by design,100 well positioned to win this competition.
The third, and perhaps most important, indicator of merit implicated by my
findings is the government investigation. Many studies use SEC investigations
specifically as an indicator of merit,101 and event-driven cases usually (although not
universally) do not involve an SEC investigation. However, they generally do
involve a non-SEC investigation, and my results indicate that these investigations are
significant predictors of the success of OV lawsuits.
Should these non-SEC investigations qualify as indicia of merit, similar to SEC
investigations in the existing literature? Previous studies have used SEC
investigations as “hard evidence” of investor fraud102 because the SEC has limited
resources and is therefore likely to focus its efforts on cases where defendants’
conduct was likely fraudulent.103 At first blush, non-SEC investigations are not
analogous because the investigators at issue—the FDA, EPA, NHTSA, etc.—are
not charged with investigating misconduct against investors. Yet it is certainly
plausible that a firm, having marketed a drug with harmful side effects or a car with
uncontrollable acceleration, might compound its problems by failing to disclose its
actions to its shareholders when disclosure is obligatory, or by affirmatively
concealing them. It may be only through the efforts of non-securities investigators
that facts underlying a potential misstatement to investors are brought to light. If,
for example, drug company X touts specific safety measures in its manufacturing
process, an FDA investigator is well positioned to alert investors if, in fact, those
measures are not in place, and the company’s primary factory is negligently run and
badly contaminated.
But the fact that non-SEC regulators discover that something went wrong
does not necessarily mean that investors were defrauded. To begin with, it may be
the case that even though there was a disaster, there was no misstatement or
omission to investors punishable under the federal securities laws. For example, the
fact that an oil rig exploded and was investigated by the authorities does not

99. Coffee, supra note 39, at 12; Klausner et al., supra note 39.
100. See Perino, supra note 20, at 915 ( noting that “the lead plaintiff provisions [ of the PSLRA]
were intended to reduce the race to the courthouse and increase institutional investor participation in
class actions.” ).
101. See, e.g., Park, supra note 60; Choi et al., supra note 21, at 872; Pritchard, et al., supra note
21; Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (2009 ); Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less after the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 620–21 ( 2006 ); Dain C. Donelson, Justin
J. Hopkins & Christopher G. Yust, The Role of Directors ‘and Officers’ Insurance in Securities Fraud Class
Action Settlements, 58 J.L. & ECON. 747 (2015 ).
102. See id.
103. See Pritchard, et al., supra note 21, at 43.
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implicate fraud against investors if the firm made no misstatements about the
underlying facts and did not hide any information that it was obligated to disclose.104
Moreover, even if there was such a misstatement or omission, it must be material
and made with scienter to constitute a 10b-5 claim. Many of the catastrophes that
result in OV lawsuits may truly be black swan events, such that the risk that they
would occur was so slight as to be immaterial, and thus disclosure of the risk was
not required under the securities laws.105 Alternatively, even if the risk ultimately
was material, managers may not have perceived it to be so, and therefore did not
disclose the risk not because they thought they had anything to hide, but because
they honestly and un-recklessly misjudged the likelihood that the disaster would
occur. Under 10b-5, this constitutes mistake, rather than fraud, because the
managers lacked scienter. In both of these situations, the fact of the underlying
disaster opens the door to hindsight bias,106 potentially increasing pressure on
defendants to settle.
Accordingly, the characteristics that proxy for merit in the literature may not
always signal that event-driven lawsuits are, in fact, meritorious. Large settlements
may be driven by the difficulties of managing mass litigation on multiple fronts;
institutional investors may be enticed by the potentially lucrative combination of
government investigations and deep-pocketed defendants; and the government
investigations that accompany these lawsuits may not reliably indicate fraud against
investors. To be sure, massive settlements with shareholders may indicate true
investor fraud,107 and it is undoubtedly the case that some percentage of managers
104. See, e.g., Foley v. Transocean Ltd., 861 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 ( S.D.N.Y. 2012 ) ( noting that
“[ i ]t is difficult to discern from Lead Plaintiff’s sprawling [ complaint ]—and even its brief in opposition
to the motion to dismiss—the specific misrepresentations or omissions that Lead Plaintiff intended to
assert as being actionable under the securities laws,” and that “this holding has no bearing on whether
Transocean has substantive liability for the Macondo accident. Despite Lead Plaintiff’s attempts to
conflate the two issues, they are wholly separate” ).
105. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 ( 1988 ) ( establishing the “probability/magnitude”
test for materiality ); see also Gay v. Axline, 23 F.3d 394 (1st Cir. 1994 ) ( unpublished table decision )
( possibility of large sale was not material despite the magnitude of potential event because the
probability of its occurrence was very low ).
106. Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 ( 2004 ) ( noting that hindsight bias implicates both the materiality and scienter
elements of 10b-5 claims, and commenting that “[ e ]ven in the absence of any misconduct, a bad
outcome alone might lead people to believe that corporate managers committed securities fraud.
The hindsight bias thus creates a considerable obstacle to the fundamental task in securities regulation
of sorting fraud from mistake” ); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Changing Character of Securities
Litigation in 2019: Why It’s Time to Draw Some Distinctions, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG ( Jan. 22, 2019 ),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/22/the-changing-character-of-securities-litigation-in2019-why-its-time-to-draw-some-distinctions/ [ https://perma.cc/BX3T-27SD ] ( noting that when
predicting the risk of future catastrophes, “[ w ]hen the risk seemed remote at the time the corporate
issuer made its disclosures, both the materiality of the issuer’s omission and its alleged scienter would
seem open to serious challenge” ).
107. See Reiser & Toll, supra note 37 ( discussing the “mega-settlements” that have arisen from
some event-driven securities class actions and arguing that these constitute meritorious cases that
should be allowed to proceed ).
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depraved enough to externalize costs to innocent third parties are also depraved
enough to lie to their shareholders about it. However, it is difficult to determine
exactly what this percentage is.
C. Do Event-Driven Securities Class Actions Deter, Compensate, or Monitor Firms’
Externality of Costs to Third Parties?
Irrespective of their merits, it is also necessary to examine event-driven
lawsuits from a broader policy perspective. Does the possibility of being sued in an
event-driven securities class action help deter firms from externalizing their costs
to third parties? Do these lawsuits help make whole victims that were damaged by
the firm’s misconduct? Are these lawsuits an effective mechanism for helping
shareholders and the general public oversee firms’ conduct? Although these
questions easily become conceptually entangled, I address them below under the
rubric of deterrence, compensation, and monitoring. These criteria constitute
further metrics by which we can assess whether event-driven securities class actions
are desirable.
1. Deterrence
Proponents of securities class actions often back up their arguments on
deterrence grounds. The securities class action in general has been touted by some
scholars as picking up regulatory slack in an arena where public enforcers face
serious resource constraints;108 others argue that private securities class actions
provide deterrence where enforcers lack the proper incentives to do so
effectively.109 Although the deterrence rationale for securities class actions generally
is not without its numerous detractors in the literature,110 there may be reasons to

108. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 126–27 ( 2005 ) ( “Because the SEC lacks adequate resources to
effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential to achieve an
appropriate level of deterrence.” ); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities
Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 652 (1996 ) ( agreeing with “the conventional view that private litigation
is a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement” ).
109. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 99 (2008 ) ( “[ S ]ecurities class actions . . . guard against selective
enforcement and inaction by the SEC” and “overcome[ ] lackluster governmental incentives.” ); James
J. Park, Rules, Principles and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 121
( 2012 ) ( “[ C]ompetition among enforcers can prevent a captured regulator from underenforcing the
securities laws.” ).
110. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A
Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2184 ( 2010 ) ( arguing that overdeterrence of securities fraud
is costly, and may increase the cost of capital, or induce suboptimal disclosure ); Rose, supra note 21, at
1327 ( arguing that “[ i ]t is also very difficult for profit-driven plaintiffs’ lawyers to achieve the optimal
level of sanctions because the amount that the defendant pays out determines the level of enforcement,
which “leads to excessive enforcement and, as a predictable result, overdeterrence” ); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 641
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think that these actions play a deterrence role in the context of event-driven
securities class actions specifically. One reason why securities class actions may not
generally be effective deterrents to bad conduct is that much securities fraud tends
to be the product of last-period concerns by management; unless the firm is in dire
straits, the threat of firing is often sufficient to prevent managers from committing
fraud.111 However, it is possible that the misstatements driving OV cases are not
necessarily the product of last-period concerns. Where they are not, OV cases
arguably present a better case for deterrence than garden-variety financial
misstatements, since they may depress share value, and therefore could give
managers, who presumably own stock, the incentive to appropriately disclose the
risks that may result in the disasters underlying these lawsuits.112 However, the
likelihood that this occurs turns on the probability that the misconduct will be
discovered.113 Moreover, as discussed above, these risks may be highly improbable
or difficult to calculate, and under such circumstances, deterrence on these grounds
would be minimal.
Another reason that event-driven securities class actions might serve as a
useful deterrence mechanism is that they may extract penalties from defendant
firms for bad conduct where other constituencies have difficulty doing so.
Commentators have also argued that piggyback lawsuits specifically “may cure
existing under-enforcement and deter future under-enforcement by allowing a
second agent to fill the remedial gap.”114
In OV cases, there are two potential sets of plaintiffs who might piggyback on
a regulatory investigation: (1) the people whose harm the government is
investigating (for example, the coastal residents at an oil spill site or the patients
knowingly fitted with faulty medical devices), and (2) the shareholders of the
defendant firm. Accordingly, there are two levels of redundancy to remedy potential
underdeterrence. If regulators or primary victims underdeter OV defendant firms,
either may sue as backup for the other. But even if neither of these actors is able or
willing to penalize the defendant firm, shareholders may nonetheless deter future
misconduct by extracting meaningful settlements.

( 1985 ) ( explaining that “the higher the payoff [ from the lawsuit ], the more people will spend
investigating and bringing suits” ); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 958–59 ( 1999 ) ( arguing that
securities class actions “target the wrong party for sanctions” because the firm pays the settlement while
the manager who actually committed the fraud is, at worst, fired ); see also Erickson, Overlitigating, supra
note 35, at 77.
111. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 702–03.
112. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking
the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008 ).
113. I am grateful to Jennifer Arlen for this insight.
114. Clopton, supra note 31, at 290.
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Assessing the deterrence value of OV cases in this context requires some
insight into how often and with what results shareholders, regulators, and direct
victims pursue defendant firms for the same misconduct. Accordingly, I use press
releases and media articles to investigate lawsuits brought by the direct victims of
the OV defendant firms’ misconduct. Table 12 shows how many OV cases involve
investigations by regulators, and how many involve follow-up litigation by the
primary victims of the misconduct. The vast majority of OV cases—sixty out of
sixty-eight—involved some regulatory investigation or other action by the
government. Forty-five total OV cases involved lawsuits by the primary victims of
the firms’ misconduct. It thus appears that the direct victims of such misconduct
take action less frequently than the government, and at only about sixty-five percent
of the frequency with which shareholders sue.
Even more striking are the recovery rates for primary victims in OV cases who
sue on their own behalves. Table 11 shows the amounts that regulators and primary
victims recovered and compares these figures with the amounts that shareholders
recovered in the OV cases where there was a recovery. Mean recoveries for
regulators appear to be significantly larger than for the primary victims when they
sue, although median recoveries for primary victims are larger than median
regulatory penalties. In any case, both are larger than the recoveries that
shareholders receive. Note, however, that shareholders recover more frequently
than either regulators or primary victims.
These findings suggest that OV shareholder lawsuits may be valuable because
they may impose penalties on firms where other actors have difficulty doing so.
Although settlement amounts to shareholders are smaller, they arguably increase
deterrence by adding to what defendant firms must pay in regulatory penalties and
to direct victims. Moreover, I find that in fifteen of OV cases in the sample, the
shareholder settlement is the only monetary penalty that the firm pays. Accordingly,
it appears that shareholder lawsuits might serve a deterrence function particularly
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where regulatory penalties are low115 or non-pecuniary,116 or where the direct
victims of the firm’s misconduct have difficulty suing on their own behalves.117
There are, however, several caveats to the conclusion that OV lawsuits help
to optimally deter corporate misconduct. The first is a data constraint. Although it
does appear from the information I was to gather that some kinds of corporate
misconduct may not be adequately deterred by regulators and direct victims alone,
I find that many settlements with direct victims are private. It is therefore possible
that lawsuits by direct victims play a larger role in deterrence than the sample shows,
and pile-on shareholder litigation actually overdeters defendant firms.
Second, even if the data were completely reliable, it may not indicate that OV
cases are optimally deterrent. Although the sample shows that there are OV lawsuits
in which the shareholder settlement is the only penalty the defendant firm pays, this
may not necessarily indicate that without the shareholder settlement, the defendant
firm would be underdeterred. Since the vast majority of OV lawsuits—sixty out of
sixty-eight—follow a regulatory action, it is possible that the relevant regulators in
the twenty cases where neither regulators nor direct victims recovered concluded
that the defendant firm’s misconduct was insufficient to merit a penalty, and the
firms settled the shareholder lawsuits for nuisance value. It is difficult to say, based
on my sample, if this is occurring; the median shareholder settlement for OV actions
where neither the government nor the direct victims collected a monetary award is
$3.2 million.118 A settlement value of three million dollars or below is a common
115. See, e.g., Tapia-Matos v. Caesarstone Sdot-Yam, Ltd., No. 15-CV-6726, 2016 WL 3951184
( S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2016 ) ( defendant firm’s subpar workplace standards allegedly led to silicosis-related
injuries and deaths of its workers, but firm was fined only $7,619 by OSHA ); Inspection: 1198695.015,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_
detail?id=1198695.015 [ https://perma.cc/F9PB-MVHR ] ( last visited Sept. 8, 2022 ). In this case,
shareholders recovered $2.2 million and the injured workers roughly $2.6 million. See Caesarstone Enters
Settlement Agreement Related to Occupational Risks with Silica Dust, REUTERS ( Jan. 4, 2018, 8:46 AM ),
https://www.reuters.com/article/brief-caesarstone-enters-settlement-agre/brief-caesarstone-enterssettlement-agreement-related-to-occupational-risks-with-silica-dust-idUSFWN1OZ0OE [ https://
perma.cc/4R2M-L28A].
116. See, e.g., Second Amended Class Action Complaint, In re Atossa Genetics, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 13-CV-01836, 2014 WL 4983551 ( W.D. Wa. Oct. 19, 2017 ), 2017 WL 5906539 ( alleging that
defendant firm marketed breast cancer diagnostic test as equivalent to mammogram or pap smear
even though the test was not effective or FDA approved, and then pulled the product from the
market when it received a warning letter—but no penalty—from the FDA ), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 868 F.3d 784 ( 9th Cir. 2017 ). There does not appear to have been any lawsuit by patients receiving
the test in this case. Shareholders recovered $3.5 million. See In re Atossa Genetics, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 13-CV-01836, 2018 WL 3546176 (W.D. Wa. July 20, 2018 ). Of the 69 OV cases in the sample, 35
involve regulatory inquiries or actions that did not impose monetary penalties.
117. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws at 4, Cambridge
Ret. Sys. v. Invacare Corp., No. 13-CV-01165 ( N.D. Ohio Nov. 15, 2013 ) ( alleging that defendant firm
had ignored repeated FDA warnings with respect to, among other things, hospital beds that caught fire
and suffocated patients ). No patient lawsuits were found based on this misconduct, but shareholders
recovered $11 million. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Invacare
Corp., No. 13-cv-01165 ( N.D. Ohio June 2, 2015 ).
118. There are twenty OV cases that meet these criteria. The mean settlement amount is $6.2 million.
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proxy for nuisance litigation.119 Accordingly, while it is possible that OV securities
class actions serve a deterrence function by penalizing misconduct that would
otherwise go unpunished, it is difficult to assert with confidence that this is the
case. Finally, it appears that most OV lawsuits are brought against large firms,120
but this does not necessarily mean that small firms do not also externalize their
costs to third parties. Accordingly, OV cases may underdeter third-party
misconduct perpetrated by smaller firms.
Accordingly, while the available information does lend some support to the
idea that OV cases play a deterrence role, there exist some potential caveats.
2. Compensation
The second end that OV shareholder lawsuits might serve is compensation.
Piggyback litigation in other contexts is not without its champions on the ground
that government investigations make it easier for victims to recover.121 However,
this defense of piggyback litigation may not always be salient to an analysis of OV
cases. First, and most obviously, event-driven securities class actions do not
compensate the primary victims of the firms’ misconduct. Further, as previously
discussed, the non-SEC investigations that are prevalent in event-driven cases are
not conducted with shareholders in mind and may not always shed light on whether
they have actually been defrauded.122 Therefore, it does not always make sense that
investors should be compensated based on such investigations. Moreover, although
compensation is the original justification for allowing a private right of action under
Section 10(b),123 few commentators currently justify securities class actions on
compensatory grounds.124 As is widely acknowledged, recoveries by injured
shareholders are paid by the corporation and its insurance policies, and thus are

119. See James D. Cox & Frank Partnoy, Introduction: Professor Randall Thomas’s Depolarizing
and Neutral Approach to Shareholder Rights, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1765 ( 2019 ) ( “Securities class
action suits ending in small settlements, those smaller than $2–3 million, have long been suspected of
being ‘strike suits’—suits without much merit brought primarily to extort a settlement that provides
fees to the attorney but little to nothing to class members.” ). These settlements likely represent avoided
litigation costs. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 740–41 ( 1995 ).
120. See infra Table 1.
121. See Erichson, supra note 31.
122. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
123. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946 ).
124. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 10 (“[ F ]ew today defend FOTM suits on compensatory
grounds.” ); TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 6 ( 2010 )
( “[ A]n emerging consensus among most corporate and securities law scholars rejects compensation as
a justification for shareholder litigation.” ); Langevoort, supra note 108, at 651 ( “[ T ]he compensatory
system has relatively few informed, non-self-serving defenders.” ); see also STEFANO CASSELLA &
ANTONINO EMANUELE RIZZO, DO SHAREHOLDERS GAIN FROM THEIR RIGHT TO SUE? EVIDENCE
FROM FEDERAL JUDGE TURNOVER ( 2022 ), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310090 [ https://
perma.cc/R8JL-HVFT ] ( finding that “strengthening the right to sue causes an equity value loss.” ).
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inevitably circular.125 These lawsuits are also lawyer-driven, and thus any recovery is
diminished by substantial attorney fees.126 Therefore, compensation, especially for
third-party victims, is an unlikely policy justification for these lawsuits.
3. Monitoring
However, even if shareholder compensation in securities class actions nets out
to zero, the subset of shareholders who sue are compensated by those that do not,
and the prospect of being compensated as a plaintiff in an OV case may affect
incentives of shareholders to monitor what the firm is doing. Shareholders may
have incentives to pursue securities class actions after the fact rather than electing
directors committed to pursuing preemptive measures to prevent third-party
harm because much third-party harm, if undetected, benefits shareholders.127
Cost-cutting measures that might lead to quality control problems, design issues,
or negligence in execution may, so long as these problems remain under the radar,
lead to an increase in profits, and thus shareholder wealth.128 Accordingly, it
is possible that investors might prefer their directors and managers to ignore red
flags or simply not inquire about potential problems so long as the share price
remains high.
On the most cynical view, there may be circumstances under which the
event-driven securities class action acts as a type of insurance to shareholders that
rationally prefer their management to externalize costs to third parties: if the
management gets away with it, the shareholders win. And if the management is
caught, the litigating shareholders do not lose (or at least probably will not lose as
125. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 16, at 72–73 ( stating that 10b-5 class actions relying on
the fraud on the market ( FOTM ) theory are “now generally seen to have altogether failed to deliver on
the [ goal of investor compensation ]. Real-world [ ] actions proceed on an enterprise-liability theory
with corporate—as opposed to individual—defendants funding the compensation; investor ‘victims’
are accordingly compensated from the pockets of other innocent investors. It follows that not only
does FOTM fail as a compensatory mechanism, it doesn’t even make sense.” ); see also Rose, supra note
10, at 1244 ( arguing that 10b-5 securities class actions “result in a transfer of funds from one group of
innocent shareholders to another. Over time well-diversified shareholders will find themselves on
both sides of the ‘v.’ in roughly equal measure, meaning to them FOTM suits are an exercise in pocket
shifting or, worse, a negative proposition once attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs are taken
into account” ).
126. Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487,
1503 ( 1996 ) ( “[ P]ayments by the corporation to settle a class action amount to transferring money
from one pocket to the other, with about half of it dropping on the floor for lawyers to pick up.” ).
127. See Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855,
896–97 ( 2014 ) (“[ C]urrent shareholders generally have an economic incentive to underinvest in
monitoring to the extent that they reap the full benefit of corporate wrongdoing, but externalize
part ( or all ) of the cost to nonshareholders . . . . [ I]nvestors have an interest to underinvest in
compliance designed to prevent illegality that benefits the firm.” ); Donald C. Langevoort, Internal
Controls after Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,”
31 J. CORP. L. 949, 960 (2006 ) ( arguing that investors do not benefit from the revelation of wrongful
conduct and therefore would rather have “less-than-full transparency ex post” ).
128. See Velikonja, supra note 127; Langevoort, supra note 127.
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much) because they will likely be able to extract a settlement in a securities class
action. This is consistent with scholarship that posits that securities class actions in
general constitute a “litigation put” by which shareholders are entitled to recover a
portion of their losses if the stock price falls a sufficient amount, irrespective of the
merits of the claim under the securities laws.129 But this issue is even more
problematic for event-driven securities class actions specifically, because rather than
simply insuring against business loss, it reinforces a shareholder preference for
managers to externalize costs to third parties to bolster stock price. This could
increase the likelihood that third parties will ultimately be harmed.
While event-driven securities class actions are not unique in allowing
shareholders to sue for their firms’ infliction of harm on third parties, other similar
types of lawsuits do not create the same incentives. The most obvious analog is the
strand of jurisprudence imposing the duty of managers to monitor, laid out in the
Delaware cases Caremark130 and Stone v. Ritter.131 Under these cases, shareholders
may recover for breach of fiduciary duty when directors fail to adequately inform
themselves of risks requiring their attention.132 This line of cases is the original
source of much of firms’ modern compliance infrastructure.133 Such infrastructure
is meant to allow boards to monitor conduct within their companies that not only
might harm shareholders, but that might harm other parties.134
However, shareholder recoveries in OV cases provide different incentives
from those under Caremark. First, Caremark claims are narrower in scope than OV
lawsuits, as they target only directors,135 and they are generally brought as derivative
lawsuits, meaning that the firm, rather than the shareholders, recovers. This setup
may help mitigate the “lawsuit as insurance” problem described above; even if
shareholders win or settle a Caremark claim, any award goes to the firm, and not
into the plaintiffs’ pockets. Second, the standard that plaintiffs must meet under
Caremark is high, as it requires that “the directors utterly failed to implement any
reporting or information system or controls; or . . . having implemented such a

129. Alexander, supra note 18 ( explaining that “[ b]ecause the recovery depends only on the
occurrence of a large loss and does not require proof that a securities violation has actually occurred,
the process is more akin to no-fault insurance against market losses than to judicial enforcement of
substantive law” ). To the extent that the PSLRA has decreased non-merit-based settlements, this
argument, of course, holds less force. As previously discussed, however, the PSLRA has not eliminated
nuisance settlements for meritless claims.
130. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996 ).
131. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 ( Del. 2006 ).
132. Id.
133. Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647, 648
( 2018 ) ( arguing that Caremark is responsible for the “visibility and urgency of compliance and ethics
in the board room” ).
134. Indeed, some recent significant Caremark cases involve precisely this kind of conduct. See,
e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019 ) ( involving a listeria outbreak in the manufacturing
plant of one of America’s largest ice cream producers ).
135. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959.
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system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.”136 This makes a recovery notoriously difficult in these lawsuits.137 Third,
Delaware’s chancery courts are lauded for their efficiency.138 By contrast, securities
class actions are typically lengthy, drawn-out affairs139 that increase pressure on
defendants to settle, even if the merits of the plaintiffs’ case are dubious. While
Caremark has been criticized as “irrelevant”140 and “underwhelming”141 in
prompting managers to pursue adequate compliance, shareholders who suspect that
their management is not taking adequate precautions to protect third parties know
that a Caremark claim is unlikely to insulate them from the firm’s drop in value
when the skullduggery is discovered.
To be sure, securities class actions are themselves a form of shareholder
monitoring, and in view of the information asymmetries inherent in corporate
governance, probably the dominant one. However, they are not ideal for costs that
firms externalize to third parties. This is because securities class actions are brought
after the harm is inflicted; a more socially optimal form of monitoring would be one
that prevents these harms in the first instance. This is doubly true because the
information from my sample (though admittedly patchy) seems to suggest that
direct victims of the firms’ misconduct are significantly less likely than shareholders
to sue, and even less likely to recover ex post.142
But even independent of the problem that third parties must actually be
harmed in order for it to be deployed, event-driven lawsuits are not ideal as a

136. AmSouth Bancorporation, 911 A.2d at 370.
137. See Matthew W. Abbott, Ariel J. Deckelbaum, Ross A. Fieldston, Andrew G. Gordon,
Jaren Janghorbani & Jeffrey D. Marell, Paul Weiss Discusses Delaware Decisions Showing Renewed Focus
on Board Oversight, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG ( Nov. 20, 2019 ), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/
11/20/paul-weiss-discusses-delaware-decisions-showing-renewed-focus-on-board-oversight/ [ https://
perma.cc/6FGV-2G3Q ] ( “As a result of these high pleading standards, Caremark claims have
historically had limited success.” ).
138. Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but
Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 200 ( 2008 ) (“Delaware’s judges typically have
considerable expertise in corporate law matters, and Delaware courts provide litigants with an expedited
process that results in speedier and more efficient resolutions of disputes.” ).
139. See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 5 ( 2012 ), https://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
Cornerstone_Research_Settlements_2011_Analysis.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5A54-6HBW ] ( finding
that more than forty percent of securities class actions take between three and four years to settle ).
140. Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 15, 44 (2013 ).
141. Todd Haugh, Caremark’s Behavioral Legacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 611, 614 (2018 ).
142. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see Matt Levine, Money Stuff: It Doesn’t Pay to
Be Too Ethical, BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2020, 9:02 AM ), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
newsletters/2020-05-01/money-stuff-it-doesn-t-pay-to-be-too-ethical [ https://perma.cc/FQ45-LXSR ]
( “[ W ]omen who worked at [ the defendant firm ] started suing the company for discrimination in 2008,
there is a class action involving 70,000 of them, there was a New York Times Magazine story about it
last year, and it still has not been resolved. The women who were harassed and underpaid have not
been compensated; the shareholders, of course, have been.” ).
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monitoring mechanism. This is because in many instances, these lawsuits do not
actually induce firms to disclose the information that investors, and indeed, the
general public, would like to know about disasters that harm third parties. Absent a
duty to speak, firms are not obligated to disclose many material facts that go into
the making or mitigation of a disaster.143 Most 10b-5 claims in this area are based
on the “half-truth” doctrine, which requires defendants to disclose sufficient
information to prevent statements already made from being misleading;144 but
where most disclosures are voluntary,145 defendants can circumvent this obligation
by not speaking at all.
Moreover, where defendants do make statements that could be considered
misleading after disaster strikes (for example, to tout their safety procedures or
sustainability/governance initiatives in somewhat general terms), when the lawsuits
hit, they “commonly claim that whatever was said, no matter how positive, was too
general, speculative, or vague to be anything more than ‘puffery,’ such that it was
neither material nor misleading regardless of what was left unsaid.”146 This gives
defendant firms incentive only to speak about potential risks in the most general
terms, which does not promote effective monitoring. Because a firm’s best response
to the possibility of an OV lawsuit is typically “gamesmanship or stone-cold
silence,”147 it seems hard to say that these lawsuits promote meaningful disclosure.
Relatedly, OV lawsuits may draw attention away from securities lawsuits that
could promote better disclosure, such as, for instance, those involving financial
disclosures. To return to the sample, these lawsuits are likely to produce better
outcomes for the plaintiffs who bring them—they are less likely to be dismissed148
and are more likely to produce high settlement amounts than lawsuits for
misconduct whose primary victims are the shareholders themselves.149 They are also
significantly more likely to involve an institutional investor as lead plaintiff, and
pension funds especially are likely to participate in this capacity.150 One
interpretation of these results is that these institutional investors—the “sheriffs of
Wall Street”151—may be focusing their resources on cases that are likely to result in
high payouts but unlikely to incentivize disclosures that are of much value to
anyone. Accordingly, it appears that the value of OV cases as a mechanism for
143. See Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures, supra note 84, at 991–92 ( discussing the items in
SEC disclosures that firms are actually obligated to disclose in the Form S-K, and remarking that risk
assessments “can easily devolve to boilerplate, offering a recitation of risks the majority of which an
intelligent investor could surmise even without the disclosure,” while the MD&A is “less than entirely
reliable as an early warning device” ).
144. Id. at 974.
145. Id. at 979.
146. Id. at 978.
147. Id. at 1015.
148. See infra Table 6.
149. See infra Table 7.
150. See infra Tables 6, 7, 11.
151. WEBBER, supra note 92.

Second to Printer_Strauss.docx (Do Not Delete)

1366

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/11/2022 11:35 PM

[ Vol. 12:1331

monitoring may be questionable, and these cases may also distract shareholders who
could be more effective monitors in other contexts.
D. Potential Policy Prescriptions
As previously discussed, proponents of event-driven securities class
actions—the most vocal of whom are plaintiffs’ counsel—do not consider these
actions in need of reform. Conversely, opponents of these actions in the industry
and in academia suggest that these actions often lack merit, and significant steps
should be taken to limit them.152 The truth probably lies somewhere between these
divergent and self-interested perspectives. But any discussion of reform to OV
lawsuits ignores the obvious: these lawsuits are suboptimal because in order for the
lawsuit to be brought, the third party must be injured. In a perfect world, the
solution to this problem would be for firms to adopt better mechanisms to prevent
this injury altogether. As previously discussed, this may not be the result that
shareholders prefer; they may prefer that the management continue to externalize
costs to third parties as long as the stock price remains high, and then they may sue
to at least partially make up their losses if the management is caught. However, it is
unlikely that shareholders would be more vigilant monitors of misconduct against
third parties in the absence of event-driven lawsuits, simply because they lack the
ability. In general, shareholders face serious constraints with respect to access to
information and collective action.153 Voter apathy, particularly among retail
investors, is rampant.154 Large index fund managers, which collectively vote roughly
twenty-five percent of the S&P 500, tend to defer excessively to managers.155 The
structural overhaul of corporate governance that would be necessary to remedy
these problems is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I address two more
targeted mechanisms that might help shareholders and the general public
better monitor firm conduct that externalizes costs to third parties: more
specific catastrophic risk disclosures and mandatory ESG disclosures. Although
event-driven securities class actions can only be brought in the wake of harm that

152. Though it is almost certainly too blunt an instrument, my sample strongly suggests that
limiting the use of non-SEC inquiries as facts that may be pleaded in a 10b-5 class action complaint
would dramatically decrease the success and probably the incidence of event-driven securities class
actions. Without regulatory findings, many plaintiffs likely could not meet the specificity requirements
to withstand a motion to dismiss, and a significant number probably would not even try.
153. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999 ); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 12–13 ( 1991 ); Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or
Liability Rule?, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 749–63 ( 1997 ).
154. See Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71
S TAN . L. R EV . 687, 695 (2019); Mary Ann Cloyd, 2014 Proxy Season Mid-Year Review,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( July 17, 2014 ), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/
07/17/2014-proxy-season-mid-year-review/ [ https://perma.cc/5BXX-934H].
155. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030, 2033 ( 2019 ).
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has already occurred, these lawsuits could enforce the accuracy of my proposed
disclosures, which might mitigate such harm the next time around.
First, requiring more specific disclosures about the probability of catastrophic
operational risks would force managers to reveal those risks. The general public,
including outsiders that might bear the brunt of a manifestation of such risks, would
thus be on notice. Such disclosure might also induce better monitoring; if such risks
were more explicitly in the public eye, detection of the kinds of cost-cutting that
could cause those risks to materialize might be more likely. Accordingly, the odds
of a stock price increase from undetected conduct that externalizes risks to outsiders
might be lower, mitigating shareholders’ preferences for management to engage in
such conduct. To be useful, such disclosures would not only need to identify the
risk but also the probability that it might occur, and how the management arrived
at that probability.156
A complementary solution to make event-driven securities class actions better
mechanisms to prevent firms from harming third parties might be to implement
mandatory, measurable ESG standards.157 Several reforms would be required to
achieve this goal. First, ESG disclosures currently are not mandatory, and the SEC
has generally resisted calls to update disclosures to include ESG metrics158 (although
more recent proposals appear to be gaining increasing traction).159 Investors,
who are increasingly interested in ESG issues,160 have resorted to shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8 to seek disclosures from their companies,161 but recent
156. See Langevoort, supra note 84, at 991 ( noting that current line-item disclosures require
identification, but not the probability, of significant risks ). Because such specific information is
difficult to calculate and could form the basis for substantial liability, however, a nontrivial safe harbor
might be required to induce managers to make such disclosures.
157. Indeed, such reforms have been recently proposed. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Proposes to Enhance Disclosures by Certain Investment Advisers and Investment Companies
About ESG Investment Practices (May 25, 2022 ), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-92
[ https://perma.cc/6GMT-P55S ].
158. Fisch, supra note 13. For a discussion of the shortcomings of ESG metrics, see Ofer Eldar,
Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. REV. 937, 956–57 ( 2020 ).
159. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION OF THE SEC
INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE RELATING TO ESG DISCLOSURE (2020 ), https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/esg-disclosure.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6QH5-EP2F ]
( arguing that “the time has come for the SEC to address the issue” of incorporating ESG materials into
the integrated disclosure regime for registered issuers ). The SEC has also increased its focus on ESG
and climate-related disclosures generally. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Satyam
Khanna Named Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG ( Feb. 1, 2021 ), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2021-20 [ https://perma.cc/HLQ3-987C ]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues ( Mar. 4, 2021 ),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42 [ https://perma.cc/C2T3-9PJ3 ].
160. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 940; see also Letter from Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 10–11 ( Oct. 1, 2018 ), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [ https://perma.cc/YK8W-7UJC] ( noting that high-profile institutions
such as Blackrock, Bloomberg, and the Human Capital Management Coalition have called for improved
sustainability disclosure ).
161. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 940.
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evidence indicates that ESG shareholder proposals are often omitted from
corporate ballots.162 Notably, the most common plaintiffs in the OV cases in my
sample—pension funds, which are involved with the majority of OV cases163—are,
out of all institutional investors, the least likely to support such measures.164
Importantly, recent studies have also shown that public pension funds’ votes are
“critical to the success of a proposal,”165 raising the chances of passing management
proposals by 7.2% and shareholder proposals by 8.7%.166 It may be evidence of the
distorted incentives that event-driven cases produce that the plaintiffs driving these
cases do not appear to play an active role in ESG measures that might protect third
parties, and such governance measures might be particularly hard to pass without
the participation of these institutions.
The potential difficulty of procuring voluntary ESG disclosures is not the only
problem. Despite the defects of the 14a-8 process, firms have increasingly
responded to investor demand for ESG-related information by issuing standalone
ESG reports.167 However, these reports are “fragmented, of inconsistent quality,
and often unreliable.”168 First, multiple scholars have commented on the
proliferation of standard-setters that have emerged due to the absence of a uniform
disclosure regime.169 This makes ESG disclosures difficult to evaluate and compare.
Relatedly, because such disclosures are voluntary, firms can use vague language,
emphasize positive information, omit negative information, and generally finesse
their disclosures to make their sustainability practices look rosier than they really
are.170 This practice is known as “greenwashing.”171 High-profile examples of firms

162. See, e.g., Richard Alsop & Yoon-jee Kim, Shareholder Proposals 2019—ESG No-Action
Letter Trends and Strategies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( Mar. 25, 2020 ), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/25/shareholder-proposals-2019-esg-no-action-letter-trends-and-strategies/
[ https://perma.cc/5Q84-538X] (finding that forty percent of the no-action letters reviewed from
the 2019 proxy season involved ESG proposals ).
163. See infra Table 11.
164. YING DUAN, YAWEN JIAO & KINSUN TAM, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND PROXY
VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ( 2021 ), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3252801 [ https://
perma.cc/3L46-26LX ] ( noting that public pension funds are the least likely to vote in favor of ESG
measures ); see also Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 798 ( 1993 ) ( finding that there is an “inverse relation between the return on
funds’ investments . . . and policies favoring social investing” ).
165. Ying Duan, Yawen Jiao & Kinsun Tam, The Role of Public Pension Funds in Governance,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG ( Oct. 24, 2018 ), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/10/24/
the-role-of-public-pension-funds-in-corporate-governance [ https://perma.cc/7S27-6TX5 ].
166. Id.
167. Fisch, supra note 13, at 950.
168. Id. at 947.
169. See id.; Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 2017
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 92 [ hereinafter Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise ]; Eldar, at 939; Strine, Smith
& Steel, supra note 14, at 1912.
170. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 948.
171. See id.; Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 169, at 167.

Second to Printer_Strauss.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

IS EVERYTHING SECURITIES FRAUD?

10/11/2022 11:35 PM

1369

engaged in greenwashing include BP172 and Volkswagen;173 the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill and VW emissions scandal respectively (both of which led to massive
event-driven securities class actions) illustrate the extent to which these companies’
ESG reports may not have told the whole story. Second, because many sustainability
reports are not incorporated into firms’ SEC filings, they may be unreliable because
they are likely prepared with less care, often by PR or marketing personnel,
and without the oversight of gatekeepers such as securities lawyers, auditors, or
upper-level management.174
Nonetheless, mandatory, measurable ESG disclosures could play a valuable
role in preventing firms from externalizing costs to third parties, and event-driven
lawsuits might help enforce the accuracy of such disclosures. If firms undertake, in
measurable terms, to be responsible citizens, there may be less leeway for them to
maintain operational risks that could result in harm to third parties.175 Indeed, some
commentators have argued that while “[m]ost people view sustainability as an
effort to ensure that company decisions are in line with certain social or moral
values . . . by operationalizing their commitment to these values, companies are also
seeking to avert the reputational uproar, stock price drop, and legal troubles
following misconduct.”176 Similarly, others have noted,
If directors are seeking to go beyond the legal minimum and to treat
all the corporation’s stakeholders and communities of impact in an
ethical and considerate manner, the corporation is by definition
minimizing the risk of breaking the law. By trying to engage in EESG
[employee, environment, social, and governance] best practices, the
corporation will have a margin of error that keeps it largely out of the
legal grey . . . . 177
Accordingly, where ESG encourages companies “to engage in ethical, safe,
and non-deceptive conduct,” it may mitigate a firm’s propensity to tolerate risks
that externalize costs to outsiders.178 If uniform, mandatory disclosures required
firms to reveal specific facts about the methods and efficacy of their ESG efforts,

172. Eldar, Role of Social Enterprise, supra note 169.
173. Fisch, supra note 13, at 948.
174. Id. at 950.
175. Jonathan Neilan, Peter Reilly & Glenn Fitzpatrick, Time to Rethink the S in ESG, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE ( June 28, 2020 ), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/28/
time-to-rethink-the-s-in-esg/ [ https://perma.cc/BCG2-W6RA ] ( noting that ESG practices are a
“barometer for corporate culture” ).
176. Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401,
1426 ( 2020 ).
177. See Strine, Smith & Steel, supra note 14, at 1909 ( commenting in addition that such a
strategy will “create a reputation that will serve the company well with its stakeholders and regulators
when there is a situational lapse” ).
178. See id. at 1906–07 ( noting specifically that ESG policies may reinforce company
obligations not to expose “consumers to financial harm, unsafe products, or theft of personal data” ).
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event-driven securities class actions could play a role in enforcing the accuracy of
those disclosures.179
While an ideal policy solution would be one that empowers shareholders to
prevent firms from externalizing costs to third parties in the first instance, such a
solution is improbable under our current system of corporate governance. But
event-driven securities class actions could be more effective as ex post monitoring
mechanisms if the disclosures on which they were based were more useful.
Requiring more specific disclosures of catastrophic risks that might affect outsiders,
as well as of the measures firms take to be responsible corporate citizens, would
enable shareholders and the general public to better monitor these risks. And
event-driven class actions could play a potentially valuable role in holding firms
accountable for the accuracy of such disclosures.
CONCLUSION
Over the last several years, “event-driven litigation” has become more visible,
such that it seems reasonable to wonder whether everything is, indeed, securities
fraud. In this Article, I find that cases involving alleged misconduct that primarily
harms victims other than shareholders comprise a small but important portion of
securities class actions. I find that these cases are generally more successful and
lucrative than those where a firm’s misconduct primarily harmed shareholders.
Moreover, I find that the plaintiffs in these cases are generally more sophisticated
and hire more prestigious lawyers, and that the defendant firms are generally
wealthier. Perhaps most importantly, I find that these cases involve a dramatically
higher proportion of non-SEC actions, which may, for better or for worse, be
driving successful outcomes for plaintiffs. While these cases may have deterrence
value, they may also create incentives for suboptimal monitoring of firms’ conduct
with respect to third parties and do not seem to promote disclosures that are helpful
in mitigating such conduct. Accordingly, I suggest several targeted mechanisms for
increasing the utility of the disclosures that event-driven securities class actions
might enforce. My proposal could improve both the social value and the overall
quality of these lawsuits.

179. I note that here too, as some commentators have suggested, a safe harbor might be
required to induce issuers to reveal information that is specific enough to be helpful. See Fisch, supra
note 13, at 965 n.259 ( recommending a safe harbor so a firm’s “identification of a new sustainability
issue does not subject it to liability for previously failing to discuss that issue” ). However, such a safe
harbor could be more narrowly cabined than one for disclosures requiring firms to disclose the
probability of unlikely but catastrophic risks, and therefore OV actions might play a greater role in
enforcing ESG disclosure despite a safe harbor.
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TABLES
Primary Harm to Shareholders

Primary Harm to Other Victims

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Obs.

t-stat

Section 10b

.9249249

1

.263909

333

.9848485

1

.1230915

66

1.8048

Section 11

.1291291

0

.3358475

333

.0757576

0

.2666375

66

-1.2168

Dismissal

.5465465

1

.4985779

333

.3636364

0

.4847319

66

-2.7351

Settlement

7213097

0

23500000

333

24300000

6062500

64700000

66

3.7457

Assets ($m)

8017.251

400.88

30935.3

278

29558.17

1262.29

64830.57

61

3.8887

Class Period

13.36937

10

12.017

333

16.87879

13

13.33188

66

2.1276

Inst. LP

.4174174

0

.4938751

333

.6969697

1

.4630899

66

4.2432

2nd or 9th
Cir.
Restatement

.6036036

1

.4898847

333

.5151515

1

.5036001

66

-1.3339

.048048

0

.2141896

333

.0454545

0

.2098951

66

-0.0902

SEC Action

.1921922

0

.3946163

333

.1666667

0

.3755338

66

-0.4838

Non-SEC
Action
Govt Action

.045045

0

.2077151

333

.7121212

1

.4562439

66

18.6909

.2372372

0

.4260291

333

.8787879

1

.3288746

66

11.5655

Pl. Law Firm

.5675676

1

.4961591

333

.8484848

1

.3612978

66

4.3736

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Non-Merger Cases)
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Primary Harm to Shareholders
Mean
Median Std. Dev.
.5649351 1
.4965723
6454419
0
21100000
7944.469 363.89
31124.7
13.69805 10
12.20227
.3993506 0
.490562
.5974026 1
.4912191

Obs.
308
308
254
308
308
308

Primary Harm to Other Victims
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
.3692308
0
.4863522
24600000 6125000
65200000
30047.73
1299.546 65263.87
17.12308
13
13.28593
.6923077
1
.4651303
.5230769
1
.5033541
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65
65
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65
65
65

t-stat
-2.8975
4.0170
3.8605
2.0242
4.4137
-1.1038

Restatement
SEC Action
Non-SEC
Action

.0519481
.2045455
.038961

0
0
0

.2222833
.4040255
.193817

308
308
308

.0461538
.1692308
.7076923

0
0
1

.211451
.3778736
.4583625

65
65
65

-0.1926
-0.6474
18.8813

Govt
Action
Pl. Law
Firm

.2435065

0

.4298966

308

.8769231

1

.3310821

65

11.1945

.5714286

1

.495677

308

.8615385

1

.3480716

65

4.4886

Dismissal
Settlement
Assets ($m)
Class Period
Inst. LP
2nd or 9th
Cir.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (10(b) Cases Only)

Restatement
Pl. Law Firm

2nd or 9th Cir.

Dismissal
Settlement
Assets ($m)
Class Period
Inst. LP

0.320988
2550000
24787.71
16.90123
0.493827
0.567901
0.123457
0.666667

Mean
0
3100000
534.968
13
0
1
0
1

0.469765
65200000
70613.47
13.37778
0.503077
0.498454
0.33101
0.474342

0.439394
14700000
18209.89
16
0.560606
0.515152
0.030303
0.818182

Mean
0
2864500
1299.55
12.5
1
1
0
1

0.500117
35200000
48738.05
13.02778
0.500117
0.5036
0.172733
0.38865

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Investigations)

81
81
64
81
81
81
81
81

Obs.

Non-SEC Action
Median
Std. Dev.
66
66
62
66
66
66
66
66

Obs.
0.64706
424875
7866.38
10.4235
0.35882
0.54118
0.02059
0.45723

Mean

1
0
489.9
7
0
1
0
0

0.478589
1.77E+0
25477.08
11.91972
0.480362
0.499036
0.142211
0.498904

No Govt. Action
Median
Std. Dev.

340
340
293
340
340
340
340
339

Obs.

2022 ]

SEC Action
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Std. Dev.
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Individual as Lead Plaintiff

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Obs.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Obs.

Dismissal

.4522613

0

.4989711

199

.6423611

1

.4801393

288

Settlement

19000000

1955000

50500000

199

2441007

0

8356813

288

Assets ($m)

20274.11

1120.143

50320.06

178

5856.78

291.569

28647.59

241

Class Period

14.03518

9

12.44397

199

11.02778

7.5

12.60548

288

2nd or 9th
Cir.
Restatement

.5577889

1

.4979018

199

.53125

1

.4998911

288

.0502513

0

.2190139

199

.03125

0

.1742955

288

SEC Action

.201005

0

.4017625

199

.1423611

0

.3500283

288

Non-SEC
Action
Govt.
Action
Pl. Law
Firm

.1859296

0

.3900311

199

.1006944

0

.3014475

288

.3869347

0

.4882769

199

.2430556

0

.429675

288

.7336683

1

.4431546

199

.4076655

0

.4922587

287

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (Institutional Investor Lead Plaintiff)
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Obs.

Percent
Dismissed

Mean
Shareholder
Settlement

Mean
Total
Assets
($ millions)

Percent
Institutional
Lead Plaintiff

Percent SEC
Investigation

Drug/Medical
Device

33

30.3%

24,500,000

14556.47

57.5%

6.0%

Other
Healthcare

11

36.4%

8,204.545

16646.18

90.1%

36.3%

Environmental
Motor Vehicle
Consumer
Antitrust
Food &
Beverage

8
4
3
2
1

50%
25.0%
67%
50%
100%

26,400,000
109,000,000
500,000
11,300,000
0

61588.98
153506.1
250.9075
3456.537
1362.399

87.5%
50%
100%
50%
0%

25%
50%
0%
0%
0%

Working
Conditions

1

0%

2,200,000

439

0%

0%

Sexual
Harassment

1

100%

0

129517

100%

0%

Other
All
Non-Healthcare

4
22

50%
50%

8,750,000
29,500,000

18266.11
57133.86

75%
70.8%

25%
20.8%

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (OV cases by type)
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(1)
-0.196**
(-2.95)
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(2)
-0.218**
(-3.05)

(3)
-0.199**
(-2.87)

0.0313**
(2.75)

0.0481***
(4.35)

-0.00597**
(-2.63)

-0.00472*
(-2.13)

-0.0415
(-0.75)

-0.0510
(-0.94)

Institutional LP

-0.169**
(-3.00)

Restatement

0.140
(1.02)

SEC Action

-0.284***
(-4.26)

Constant

0.565***
(19.94)
0.0195
373

Adjusted R2
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.483***
(5.31)
0.0555
314

0.486***
(5.61)
0.123
314

Table 6: Dismissal (OV Case)

Table 6 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Dismiss Dummy,
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the case was dismissed. OV Case is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the case is coded as an OV case. Log total assets is the log of the total
assets of the firm measured in millions of dollars. Class period is the class period of
the lawsuit measured in months. 2nd or 9th Circuit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the lawsuit was brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits. Institutional LP is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff in the lawsuit is an institutional investor.
Class period restatement is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant firm restated
its financials during the class period and the restatement involved a misrepresentation
or fraud, rather than an error or change in accounting rules. SEC Action is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if an SEC inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action involving the
alleged misconduct was cited in the most recent complaint.
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(2)
3.914**
(3.31)

(3)
3.567**
(3.15)

Log Assets

-0.320
(-1.72)

-0.616***
(-3.45)

Class Period Months

0.0894*
(2.49)

0.0700*
(2.03)

0.636
(0.72)

0.766
(0.89)

OV Case

(1)
3.774***
(3.45)
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2nd or 9th Cir.

Institutional LP

2.913**
(3.27)

Restatement

-4.077*
(-2.13)

SEC Action

4.932***
(4.64)

Constant

6.648***
(15.05)
0.0301
373

Adjusted R2
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

6.993***
(4.80)
0.0509
314

7.048***
(5.14)
0.135
314

Table 7: Log Settlement (OV Case)

Table 7 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Log Settlement, is
the log of the settlement amount shareholders recovered. OV Case is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the case is coded as an OV case. Log total assets is the log of the total assets
of the firm measured in millions of dollars. Class period is the class period of the lawsuit
measured in months. 2nd or 9th Circuit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lawsuit was
brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits. Institutional LP is a dummy variable equal to 1
if at least one lead plaintiff in the lawsuit is an institutional investor. Class period
restatement is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant firm restated its financials
during the class period and the restatement involved a misrepresentation or fraud, rather
than an error or change in accounting rules. SEC Action is a dummy variable equal to 1
if an SEC inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action involving the alleged
misconduct was cited in the most recent complaint.
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(2)
-0.175*
(-2.41)

(3)
-0.250***
(-3.45)

Log Assets

0.0268*
(2.30)

0.0481***
(4.37)

Class Period
Months

-0.00649**

-0.00486*

(-2.84)

(-2.21)

-0.0392
(-0.70)

-0.0526
(-0.97)

Non-SEC Action

(1)
-0.139
(-1.96)
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2nd or 9th Cir.

Institutional LP

-0.186***
(-3.39)

Restatement

0.144
(1.10)

SEC Action

-0.333***
(-4.79)

Constant

0.552***
(19.66)
0.00746
373

Adjusted R2
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.506***
(5.54)
0.0450
314

0.510***
(5.93)
0.133
314

Table 8: Dismissal (Non-SEC Action)

Table 8 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Dismiss
Dummy, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the case was dismissed. Non-SEC Action
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plaintiffs cited a non-SEC inquiry (without an
SEC inquiry) in the most recent version of the complaint. Log total assets is the log
of the total assets of the firm measured in millions of dollars. Class period is the class
period of the lawsuit measured in months. 2nd or 9th Circuit is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the lawsuit was brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits. Institutional
LP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff in the lawsuit is an
institutional investor. Class period restatement is a dummy variable equal to one if the
defendant firm restated its financials during the class period and the restatement
involved a misrepresentation or fraud, rather than an error or change in accounting
rules. SEC Action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an SEC inquiry, investigation,
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(2)
2.571*
(2.13)

(3)
3.789**
(3.24)

Log Assets

-0.226
(-1.17)

-0.599***
(-3.33)

Class Period Months

0.0993**
(2.72)

0.0739*
(2.13)

0.578
(0.64)

0.776
(0.91)

Non-SEC Action

(1)
2.259
(1.97)
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2nd or 9th Cir.

Institutional LP

3.231***
(3.71)

Restatement

-4.164*
(-2.14)

SEC Action

5.656***
(5.04)

Constant

6.954***
(15.70)
0.00803
373

Adjusted R2
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

6.586***
(4.48)
0.0303
314

6.625***
(4.84)
0.136
314

Table 9: Log Settlement (Non-SEC Action)

Table 9 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Log
Settlement, is the log of the settlement amount shareholders recovered. Non-SEC
Action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plaintiffs cited a non-SEC inquiry
(without an SEC inquiry) in the most recent version of the complaint. Log total assets
is the log of the total assets of the firm measured in millions of dollars. Class period
is the class period of the lawsuit measured in months. 2nd or 9th Circuit is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the lawsuit was brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits.
Institutional LP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one lead plaintiff in the
lawsuit is an institutional investor. Class period restatement is a dummy variable equal
to one if the defendant firm restated its financials during the class period and the
restatement involved a misrepresentation or fraud, rather than an error or change
in accounting rules. SEC Action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an SEC inquiry,
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(1)
0.0690***
(6.24)

(2)
0.0691***
(6.23)

(3)
0.0676***
(6.14)

0.000751
(0.37)

0.000767
(0.37)

0.000312
(0.15)

0.173**
(2.63)

0.176*
(2.28)

0.290***
(3.45)

Gov’t Action

-0.00464
(-0.07)

SEC Action

0.0529
(0.77)

Non-SEC Action

-0.168
(-1.90)

Constant

-0.0138
(-0.18)
0.146
314

Adjusted R2
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

-0.0133
(-0.17)
0.143
314

-0.00178
(-0.02)
0.153
314

Table 10: Institutional Investor Lead Plaintiff

Table 10 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable, Institutional
Lead Plaintiff, is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one institutional investor
was a lead plaintiff in the case. OV Case is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the case
is coded as an OV case. Log total assets is the log of the total assets of the firm
measured in millions of dollars. Class period is the class period of the lawsuit
measured in months. Govt Action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if any government
inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action involving the alleged misconduct was
cited in the most recent complaint. SEC Action is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an
SEC inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action involving the alleged misconduct
was cited in the most recent complaint. Non-SEC Action is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if an inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action involving the alleged
misconduct was cited in the most recent complaint that did not involve the SEC.
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Institutional LP Type
Public pension fund
Union pension fund
Mutual Fund
Commercial bank
Other

Frequency
28
17
2
4
2

1383

Percent
53%
32%
3.7%
7.5%
3.7%

Table 11: Descriptive Statistics (OV Lead Plaintiff Institution Types)

Shareholder
Regulator
Other Victim

No.
Lawsuits
68
60
45

No.
Settlements
42
30
28

Mean
Settlement
38.2 million
1.15 billion
849 million

Med.
Settlement
11 million
60 million
153 million

Table 12: Descriptive Statistics (OV Cases: Shareholders, Regulators and Other Victims)
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